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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GEORGE SALTAS.
Plaintiff tmd Respondent.

)

vs.
DAVID _-\. _-\FFLECK. doing business
under the name and stvle of D. A.
AFFLECK GROCERY."
Defendant

No. 6173
1

1
)

KENNETH BUTTE.
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant's Abstract of Record
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(Title of Court and Cause)
1

COMPLAINT
Comes now the plaintiff above named and
for cause of action against the above named defendant complains, and alleges:
1. That there does now exist and extend, and
at all times hereinafter mentioned existed and
extended, northerly and southerly through Salt
Lake City, Utah, a paved highway known and
designated as "K" Street, and there does also exist and extend, and at all times hereinafter men-
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tioned existed and extended, westerly and easterly
through Salt Lake City, Utah, a paved and public
highway known and designated as Third Avenue,
and that said "K" Street and said Third A venue
intersect and did so intersect one and another at
all times hereinafter mentioned.
2. That the plaintiff is the father of Spero
George Saltas, deceased; that said Spero George
Saltas, at the time of his death, was 30 years of
age, and left no wife or issue surviving him;
that the plaintiff herein is the sole heir at law
of said deceased and the person entitled to bring
this cause of action.
3. That at all times hereinafter mentioned the

defendant, David A. Affleck, was engaged in the
general grocery business in Salt Lake City, Utah,
doing business under the name and style of D. A.
Affleck Grocery; and at all times hereinafter
mentioned the defendant, Kenneth Butte, was an
employee of the said defendant, David A. Affleck,
and was the driver and operator of the automobile hereinafter mentioned, owned by the defendant, David A. Affleck, and which was being driven
2

by said defendant, Kenneth Butte, for and in behalf of said defendant, D. A. Affleck, in the scope
of and in furtherance of the employment aforesaid.
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4. That on or about the 27th day of January,
1938. at Salt Lake C'ity. Utah. ut ubout tlw hour
of 1 :30 o'clock P. M. of said day. the said Spero
George Saltas was riding as a guest in an automobile driven and operated by one Gerald Franz,
'Who was then and there driving said automobile
in a northerly direction along· and upon said "K"
Street and approaching and entering the intersection of said '"K'' Street and Third Avenue, in
Salt Lake City, Utah. and said defendants were
driving and operating an automobile in a westerly
direction along and upon said Third Avenue and
approaching and entering the intersection of said
Third _\venue and said "K" Street, in Salt Lake
City, Utah: that after the automobile in which
said Spero George Saltas was riding had entered
said intersection and had proceeded over the
middle line of said intersection and while proceeding in a northerly direction, the said defendants negligently, careless and recklessly, as hereinafter more particularly set forth, did drive their
said automobile into said intersection and upon
and against the automobile being driven by said
Gerald Franz, in which said Spero George Saltas
was riding as a guest, and did strike said automobile on the right side and at approximately the
rear half portion of the same with great force
and violence, and did strike the said Spero George
Saltas with great force and violence, and, thereby
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the said Spero George Saltas did suffer serious injuries to his head and body and thereafter, by
reason of said injuries, the said Spero George
Saltas died the same day.
5. That at all times hereinafter mentioned

there were, and now are, in full foree and effect in
Salt Lake City. Utah, certain Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, Utah, known as "Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City," passed, promulgated and published by the authority of the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, in 1934, Chapter LIX of which relates to traffic and travel upon
the streets of Salt Lake City and, among other
provisions, it is provided as follows, to wit: Section 1345 (CC) and (DD) provides and fixes the
business districts and the residence districts of
and within Salt Lake City, Utah, and said Section 1345 (DD), defining the residence district,
defines and describes the same as the territory
within Salt Lake City, Utah, other than the busin~ss districts of Salt Lake City, Utah; that said
Section 1345 (CC), defining the residence districts
of Salt Lake City, Utah, defines the same as the
territory that does not embrace the street known
as Third Avenue, extending from "J" to "L"
Streets, and does not embrace "K .. Street between
Second Avenue and Fourth Avenue, in said city,
and the intersection of said Third Avenue and
"K" Street is within the residence ~istrict of Salt
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Lake City, Utah. Section l3H~ (B) of said chapter
provides that it shall be unlawful for any person
to drive a vehicle in Salt Lake City. Utah. in any
residence district. in excess of twenty-five miles
per hour. Section 1382 (a) of said chapter provides and reads as follows:

"RESTRICTIONS AS TO SPEED.
Penalty. (a) It shall be unlawful for any
person to drive a vehicle upon any street
in Salt Lake City at a speed greater than
is reasonable and prudent, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of
the highway and the hazard at intersections and any other conditions existing.
"Nor shall any person drive at a speed
which is greater than will permit the driver
to exercise proper control of the vehicle
and to decrease speed or to stop, as may be
necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle or other conveyance upon or
entering the highway in compliance with
legal requirements and with the duty of
drivers and other persons using the street
to exercise due care."
6. That said defendants were careless and
negligent as aforesaid in the following particulars:
(a) In driving their said automobile at a
speed greater than was reasonable and safe and
at a rate of speed which was dangerous to life,
limh and property, to wit: at a rate in excess of
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40 miles per hour and tn violation of said Sec-

tions 1345 (DD), 1382 (B) and 1382 (a);
4

(b) In not having at said time and place
the said automobile under immediate control;
(c) In not according to the Franz automobile
the right of way over said intersection;
(d) In failing to use due care or caution for
the safeguard of others by then and there failing
and omitting to keep a careful lookout, or any
lookout whatever, for other vehicles or cars along
and upon said "K" Street and in approaching said
intersection;
(e) In not turning their said automobile to
the left when there was ample space to have
passed at the rear of the Franz automobile without striking the same;
(f) In failing to apply the brakes to said
automobile and slowing down the same while approaching said intersection; in failing to have
said brakes in proper working condition and in
driving with defective brakes;
(g) In that defendants saw, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have seen the automobile in which deceased was riding and should
have avoided striking him with their automobile.
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7. That nt tlu.· time of his death tht• suid
Spero George Salt as was 30 yeurs of ugt•: that he
lived at the home of the plaintiff: that he wus
healthy. Yigorous. intelligent. and of attractive
character and disposition. and of great assistance.
aid and comfort to the plaintiff; that he was employed by the Utah Copper Company and earning good wages in the sum of approximately
$1 7'5.00 per month. That in consequence of the
death of said Spero George Saltas, the plaintiff
has been, and will continue to he, deprived of
his services, assistance, society and comfort, and
plaintiff has thereby sustained damage in the sum
of fifteen thousand ($15,000) dollars.

5

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment
against the defendants, and each of them, in the
sum of fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) dollars, and
for costs of this action.

H. G. METOS,
Attorney for Plaintiff.
(Duly verified by George Saltas)

13

(Title of Court and Cause)

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT, KENNETH BUTTE
Comes now Kenneth Butte, one of the defendants herein, and answering plaintiff's complaint admits, denies and alleges as follows:
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1. Answering paragraph 1 defendant admits
the allegations therein contained.
2. Answering paragraph 2 defendant alleges
that he has not sufficient information or knowledge to enable him to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations therein contained and upon such grounds and for such reason
denies said allegations.

3. Answering paragraph 3 defendant admits
that he was engaged by the defendant. David A.
Affleck, to operate a grocery delivery truck in
the business of the said David A. Affleck, but
denies that at the time said accident occurred he
was acting within the course and scope of his employment and in furtherance of any business of
the said David A. Affleck, but on the contrary
alleges the fact to be that prior to said accident
he had completed deliveries which he then had
in his truck and it was then time for him to go to
lunch; that he met two girls and consented to take
them down town; that after having so completed
his deliveries and it being his lunch period he
took said girls into his truck and started for the
business district of Salt Lake City proceeding
west on 3d Avenue; that at said time he had no
further deliveries to make for his employer until
after lunch. had no packages in his truck for
14

delivery and had no purpose for his employer in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ll
PH's. Tr.
p~

proceeding to tht' husint'ss distrid of Salt Luke
City; that said trip wus mudt' soldy for the benefit of this defendant and the two girls so being
transported by him as aforesaid. That defendant's
employer's place of business was located on 2d
A venue and T Street in Salt Lake City and this
defendant was proceeding west on 3d Avenue and
was about to cross the intersection of 3d Avenue
and K Street when the accident occurred.
4. Answering paragraph 4 this defendant
denies the allegations of negligence therein set
forth and denies that the accident at said intersection was proximately caused by any negligence
on the part of this defendant and alleges the fact
to he that he was proceeding in a westerly direction on 3d Avenue in a careful and prudent manner and with due regard to the condition of the
highway and the traffic thereon and as he appoached K Street he looked and saw no automobiles proceeding in either a northerly or southerly direction upon said street, hut as he was
about to enter said intersection he saw a northhound automobile entering said intersection from
the south which said automobile was traveling at
an excessive, dangerous and unlawful rate of
speed, to wit: at a rate of speed in excess of thirty
miles an hour; that the driver of said automobile
failed and neglected to observe the automobile
truck which this defendant was operating, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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15

carelessly and negligently failed to yield the right
of way to the automobile of this defendant which
first entered said intersection or which entered
said intersection at the same time said northbound
automobile entered the same, and the driver of
said northbound automobile carelessly and negligently failed to slacken the speed of said automobile or otherwise control or attempt to control the
same to avoid running into this defendant and seeing and appreciating that said northbound automobile was not intending to stop or yield the right
of way this defendant applied the brakes upon the
automobile which he was then and there operating and endeavored to stop or control the same
and avoid being run into by said northbound
automobile and did slacken the speed thereof and
did endeavor to avoid being so hit, but was unable
in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care to
avoid striking said automobile. That the accident
described in plaintiff's complaint was solely
caused by the carelessness and negligence of the
driver of the automobile in which the deceased,
Spero George Saltas, was riding.
5. Answering paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint defendant admits that at the time and place
described in said complaint there was in full
force and effect certain ordinances of Salt Lake
City relating to traffic and travel upon the streets
of Salt Lake City, including the ordinances limit-
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ing the speed of automobiles in tlw residential
district in Salt Lakt• City to 2> milt•s an hour. an
ordinance prohibiting the operation of an automobile at a speed greater than will permit the driver
to exercise proper control of said vehicle, and defendant further alleges that at all times mentioned
in said complaint there was in full force and effect
a city ordinance described as Section 13?2 of the
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, which ordinance, among other things. provides as follows:
.. ,Yhen two -vehicles enter an intersection at the same time the driver of the
vehicle on the left shall yield to the driver
on the right."
That this defendant entered said intersection of
Third A venue and K Street prior to or at the same
time that the automobile in which the deceased
was riding entered said intersection from the left
and this defendant was entitled to and did have
the right of way at said intersection, but the driver
of the automobile in which said deceased was riding carelessly and negligently failed to comply
with said ordinances and the accident described
in plaintiff's complaint was solely caused by such
failure and by the carelessness and negligence of
such driver in driving and operating his said automobile at a dangerous, excessive and unlawful
rate of speed, in driving and operating his said
automobile without keeping a careful, or any,
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16

lookout for other vehicles upon said highway, in
driving and operating his said automobile without keeping the same under safe, immediate, or
any, control, in driving and operating said automobile in such a manner and at such a rate of
speed that he could not and did not observe the
automobile operated by this defendant and avoid
an accident and in failing to also operate it with
due regard to the condition of the highway, the
traffic thereon and the visibility at the intersection where said accident occurred, and in failing
to use

re~sonable,

or any, care or caution for the

safety of persons upon said highway.
6. Answering paragraph 6 defendant denies
each and every allegation of negligence therein
contained and with respect to said allegations alleges that the accident described in plaintiff's
complaint was solely caused by the carelessness
and negligence of the driver of the other automobile, all as herein set forth.
7. Answering paragraph "! defendant denies
that plaintiff was damaged in the manner or to
the extent therein alleged.
8. Defendant denies generally and specifical-

ly each and every material allegation in said comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plaint contained not heretofore or hereafter admitted, denied or qualified.

GERALD IRVINE,
Attorney for Defendant,

Kenneth Butte.
(Duly

~·erified

by Kenneth Butte)

(Title of Court and Cause)
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-FIRST TRIAL
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 19th day
of May, 1938, at the hour of 10 o'clock A. M., the
above entitled matter came on for first trial before
the Honorable .Allen G. Thurman, one of the judges
of the above entitled court, sitting with a jury. H.
G ..Metos appeared as attorney for plaintiff and
Gerald Irvine appeared as attorney for the defendant, Kenneth Butte, and Ralph T. Stewart
appeared as attorney for the defendant, David
A. Affleck.
A jury was called, sworn, examined and
chosen to try the case.
247

DAVID A. AFFLECK, one of the defendants,
was sworn and testified as to the relationship of
principal and agent existing between himself and
the defendant, Kenneth Butte.
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261

262
263

264

'265

G. M. HOPKINS, police officer, testified as
follows:
I arrived at Third Avenue and K Street
approximately 1:35 P. M. and saw the automobiles. I found a truck turned over on its left side
facing east on the northwest corner of the intersection. K Street is 45 feet wide. Third Avenue
is 45 feet wide. At point X there was considerable debris in the street. Leading from that point
eastward was a heavy drag mark. A burned tire
mark was leading to this debris 36 feet long,
caused by a tire moving sideways. Said tire
burn led to the truck on the northwest corner.
We found the Ford Coupe sitting in this position

headed in a northwest direction. At the northwest corner is a utility pole with a small tree
four inches in diameter. There is a large tree
about sixteen inches in diameter. Between the
tree and the curb is grass. Leading across that
grass were two tire marks. The grass was torn
up leading right up nearly to the tree. There were
dirt marks leading back to the position of the
Ford. Along the sidewalk was a considerable

272

amount of blood. The distance from point X where
the debris was to the tree was 45 feet.

275

ERNEST H. CHRISTENSEN, police officer,
testified as follows:
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I received a eull about l :40 P . .M. und proceeded to the scene of the accident. I helped make
the measurements testified to by Officer Hopkins
and took photographs.
280
281

282

285

286

288

GERALD _-\. FRANZ, driver of the car m
which deceased was riding. testified as follows:
I am a Union Pacific stage driver and was
acquainted with S. G. Saltas. I had a 1936 Ford
Coupe. I was driving north on K Street and Mr.
Saltas was sitting next to me. As we approached
Third A venue I lost sufficient speed so I shifted
into second gear and started on across the intersection. As we got into the intersection I noticed
a truck approaching from the east. I was practically in the center of the intersection at the time
I saw the truck. When I saw it I should judge it
was 100 feet east and I believed I could beat it
across the intersection. I tried to go across the intersection and when I was practically across he
struck me on the rear part of my car on the right
side. When I saw the other car I was practically in
the center of Third A venue. I was probably 25
feet north of the south curb of Third Avenue.
Before I approached the intersection I suppose I
looked to the right. After I got into the intersection
where I indicated here I see this truck coming
possibly 100 or 110 feet up the east side of the
intersection. We were going no particular place,
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289

290

291

292

293

294

just riding around. T had no intention of turning
at Third A venue and had proceeded three blocks
up K Street before the accident occurred. I first
saw this Ford truck coming west when I was
approximately 20 or 25 feet north of the south
curb line on Third Avenue. I had reached a
point nearly in the center of Third A venue when
I first saw the Ford truck coming and at no time
prior to reaching a point approximately in the center of Third A venue did I see the Ford truck. I
would say I was 10 or 15 feet south of the south
curb line of Third Avenue when I looked east. I
didn't notice anything or I would have slowed
down or stopped. When I was about 10 or 15
feet south of the south curb line I looked east and
saw no car coming. When I was 10 or 15 feet
south of the south curb line I don't know how far
east I could see. I had a clear vision east. I never
at any time applied my brakes. My car traveled
from a point 25 feet north of the south curb line
to the point of the accident while the truck traveled 100 feet. My car traveled 10 or 12 feet while
the other car traveled 100 feet. My car was going
between 15 and 20 miles an hour.

322

GEORGE SAL TAS, plaintiff, testified as
follows:

323

I live in Bingham. Spero Saltas was my son, 30
years old. My wife died in 1934. I have six child-
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327
328

329

332
333

334

336

ren living with mt' und one girl is married. lit.•
was working for tlu.' Utah Coppt.'l' ns u mu('hinist.
Spero Saltas lived with me in my house. Spero
helped me out. He helped me at all times. That is
the only boy I had to help me. I was besides an
old man. be sick. not do anything, he do for me,
except to keep a little money for his expenses
and otherwise he worked for me. He was the only
one that helped. I had four boys going to school,
nobody else worked, two girls, same thing, and he
only worked to keep the family, Spero did. The
only time he go out was last year. He go to Yellowstone Park and to California because he make
some money. Spero purchased a car. Gave $300
for the car and have worked and paid payments.
I have worked in Bingham thirty years for the
Utah Copper and United States Mine. I have
worked regularly for that time except in 1936 when
I laid off for a while. I am working regularly now
and worked regularly in 1937. I have worked regularly for thirty years except in 1936. I have been
working regularly since 1924 except in 1936 when
I was sick. My married girl doesn't live at home.
She is 34 years old. Her husband is working. She

337

worked before she got married. My next girl is 23.
She stays home and does all things for us, keeps
house. If she finds work she goes to work. My next
girl is 22. My next boy is Paul. He is 21. He works

338

for the Utah Copper. He has worked for the Utah
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340

341
342

344

355

356

Copper about two years. He lives at home and
helps me sometimes. My next boy is Pete. He
works for the B. & G. Railroad and is 20. He
has been working about eighteen months and lives
at home. Paul earns $5.00 a day. Pete earns $3.65.
The one next t~ Pete is Tom. He is 17 and goes to
school. The next one is Alex and he goes to school.
Paul lives at home and earns $5.00 a day. He is
now working 22 days a month. Pete earns $3.65.
I make $4.25 a day for 22 days a month. The
total income for myself and the two boys is about
$13.00 a day except when we are only working
22 days a month. Spero told me and my wife that
he would not get married until the other boys
were old enough to step in and help. Maybe some
time he would get married. I have a considerable
sum of money in the bank.
Plaintiff rested and defendant, KENNETH
BUTTE, introduced evidence as follows:
KENNETH BUTTE testified as follows:
My name is Kenneth Butte and I am 25
years old. I live at 173 Q Street and was employed
by D. A. Affleck Grocery. I traveled west on Third
Avenue and stopped at N Street for the stop
sign. I then proceeded west on Third A venue to
K Street. As I approached K Street I slowed down.
I looked to the left and saw this car coming just
as T entered the intersection. He was maybe 15
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feet south of the intersection. 1 snw he was :wt
going to stop or slow down so I put on my brakes
and swerved to the right then we collided. As I
entered the intersection I was g·oing about 20 or
25 miles an hour. I turned north. I saw he wasn't
going to stop. he wa~ coming at a pretty good
rate of speed and I tried to go parallel with him.
He did not slaken his speed or put on his brakes.
I figured he was going between 35 and 45 miles
an hour. \\'hen I first saw him he was 15 or 20
feet south of the south intersection on Third
~-\-venue. I ·was about at the figure 6 when I first
saw him coming. I swerved and he just kept on
coming and my car was in a northwest position
when the cars hit and that whipped the rear end
of my truck around, threw my truck on its side
and the coupe kept going in a northwesterly direction, hit into a tree and then rolled back down.
My car was in good mechanical condition and the
brakes were good. I was observing as I drove down
Third A venue. The car coming north on K Street
did not make any turn either to the left or the
right to avoid an accident. It did not increase or
decrease speed. I estimate it was traveling between 35 and 40 miles an hour. Jt continued
straight on through the intersection. My truck entered the intersection first.
In making my deliveries a route was prepared by the manager for me to follow. Mr. Af-
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fleck would set out the deliveries I was to rna em
the way in which I was to make them, and I was
to take those orders in the order set out and follow from one customer to another in the order Mr.
Affleck set out the list of orders on the route. On
the completion of each route my duty was then to
come back to the the store and unload the truck
and get ready to take the next trip, and this process is continued all day long. There was only
one seat in the car, just behind the steering
wheel, for the driver. Mr. Affleck had prepared
a route for me to follow on this particular delivery on this day as he had done on previous
occasions. The orders were to the east end of the
avenues, Federal Heights, and Military Drive. The
last place I was to visit was 1326 Third Avenue.
The store is located on T Street and Second Avenue, and east of that you go up to Virginia Street
and up to Federal Heights and Military Drive,
Arlington Drive and up there. The store where I
work is located east and south from K Street
and Third Avenue. Beginning with K Street going in an easterly direction, each street running
parallel with K Street is given an alphabetical
letter in succession. There are nine letters between
"K" and "T." The avenues are numbered First
Avenue, Second Avenue, Third Avenue, and so on,
running from south to north. K Street and Third
Avenue, in my judgment is about a half mile from
the store. The store knew practically where I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PH's. Tr.
p~

would be all the time. In other words, my em-

353

355

362

ployer was conserving my time as much as possihle, taking the deliveries in the order that would
make the shortest run and they could keep track
of where I was at all times. On the one o'clock
route on January 27th I had five deliveries to
make. I made them in the order that Bird Affleck had given them to me. The fourth delivery
was made at 13?9 Third A venue. After I made
the fourth delivery I saw two young ladies on Military Drive and Third A venue. Military Drive
is one block east of Alta Street and is east of the
Affleck store. that is about four blocks east and
one block north of the store. The last delivery
was also east of the store. They asked me if I
was going down town, and I said, "No, but it
is my noon hour, I guess I can take you down."
Then I proceeded to the Travers home, 1326 Third
Avenue, and made my last delivery. After I had
completed that delivery I had no more groceries
or deliveries to make. That was the last delivery.
From the place where I picked up the young ladies
to the place of the last delivery was about twothirds of one of the smaller blocks. Then I proceeded west on Third A venue, passed the store
where I was employed, except the store is on
Second A venue. The five deliveries I mentioned
were all east of the store. I did not have any deliveries to make for any place west of T Street.
When I left the store to make those deliveries,
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there was no other place than to those five customers that r was to go for Affleck, and I had
not been instructed to go any place except to make
those five deliveries. I had no business for the
store or for Mr. Affleck west of T Street and had
no business to go west as far as K Street, or in
that vicinity. I had no business for the Affleck
store or for Mr. D. A. Affleck or his son that called upon me to go down to the business section of
Salt Lake City. I was driving west on Third Avenue and K Street just to take the two girls down
town. r did not have any other business whatsoever in proceeding west of T Street on Third
A venue except to take the two girls down town.
When I was employed on January 18, 193'7, Bird
Affleck gave me my instructions, and told me
how I was to make the deliveries. He told me to
take the deliveries out and then come back to the
store with the empty truck; that there would not
be any monkey business on the job. He told me
I wasn't supposed to ride anyone in the truck.
He said to not even ride members of his family
in the truck without specific permission. He told
me the truck was not to be used for anything but
the purpose of the store, and not to be used for
my own purpose. He explained to me the matter
of routing and lining up my deliveries on the particular routes and that he would line up the
order in which the deliveries were to be made
and told me that I was to follow such routes. He
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told me that upon eompleting a delivery route, L
was to come directly back to the store. While I
was working at the store. I ate at the store all
the time and did not go home for lunch. He told
me I should never carry passengers in the truck
or to take anyone into the truck but myself, and
that was the purpose of having only one seat in
the truck for the driver alone. After making my
last delivery I had no other merchandise in the
truck, and it was my duty to go directly back to
the store on Second Avenue and T Street, but
instead I proceeded west on Third A venue. That
was the first time that I had ever taken any passengers in the truck.

Q.

In other words, when you had three or
four deliveries to make they would give you the
names and addresses and you would go ahead and
make the deliveries?
A. They would give them to me enrouted, in
routed order.

Q.

But you had your choice on which street
you would take?
A.

I wasn't supposed to go out of the way

to get to a house.
384

At the time I was driving down Third Avenue toward K Street, I was not going to get any
gas.
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D. B. AFFLECK testified as follows:
My name is D. B. Affleck and I am the manager of Affleck's Grocery Store, and have charge
of the employment of people working for the
store. It is part of my duty to supervise, direct,
and instruct the employees. I explained to Mr.
Butte that the orders would be boxed and routed,
and he was to take these orders and deliver them
without changing the route whatsoever, and that
under no circumstances was he ever to take any
riders without specific instruction from the store.
I did not even allow my son to ride with him. He
was to take the orders as routed and where they
were routed, and immediately upon the last order
being delivered he was to come back to the store.
He was not to use the truck for any purpose except for the business of the store, unless I gave
him specific instructions to do so. I routed the
particular trip Mr. Butte took prior to the accident. Butte was to make five deliveries, all to the
east and south of the store. I did not authorize
him to go any place in the vicinity of K Street
and Third Avenue and Mr. Butte had no purpose
whatsoever at that time and while he was out on
that delivery in going any place west'of T Street
in the business of the D. A. Affleck Grocery. I
did not authorize or instruct him to go to any
place in the vicinity of K Street and Third Ave-
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nue, nor did I authorize him to go any place west
of T Street.
RAY VAN NOY testified as follows:

385

386

387

388

25-26

92

I live at ?65 Third Avenue just east of L
Street. The blocks are small. I am City License Inspector. I am a city police officer. I had gone home
for lunch that day. When I completed lunch I went
out to my automobile parked at the curb. It was
facing west on the north side of L Street. I observed Mr. Mfleck's truck going west as it proceeded to K Street. I saw the crash. I got in my
car and went down to the collision. It was a little
over a block to the scene of the accident. I saw
the truck as it passed me until it got to L Street.
It continued to L Street at about the same speed
as when it passed me. It was traveling between 20
and 25 miles an hour. I have no connection with
Mr. Affleck.
The court directed a verdict in favor of the
defendant, David A. Affleck, and against the plaintiff and thereafter the jury was instructed and the
case against the defendant Kenneth Butte, was
argued to the jury, which returned a unanimous
verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, Kenneth Butte, for the sum of $800.00.
Thereafter and on the 26th day of May, 1938,
plaintiff served and filed his notice of intention
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119

to move for a new trial, setting forth, among other
grounds, the following: "5. Inadequate damages
appearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice." On the 18th day of July,
1938, plaintiff's motion for a new trial was argued.
Defendant produced jurors John Haddow and
Werner Kiepe, who testified as to the manner of
reaching the verdict, and the court made the following statement:
"THE COURT: So far as the quotient verdict is concerned I am inclined to hold against
Mr. Metos. As to his motion for a new trial, that
there is evidence to go to the jury, I am inclined
to rule against him on that. I am inclined to think
at this time that the verdict is too low. I do not
mean to say by that that I will find it too low,
but the matter will be taken under advisement."
Thereafter and on the 2nd day of March, 1939,
plaintiff's motion for a new trial as to the defendant, David A. Affleck, was denied and the court
made an order that the motion for a new trial
as to the defendant, Kenneth Butte, be granted
unless said defendant, within twenty days after
notice, consent that the verdict of the jury rendered against the defendant, Kenneth Butte, and
in favor of the plaintiff, be increased to $2400.00
and that judgment for such amount be entered
against said defendant, Kenneth Butte, and in favor of the plaintiff, and that should the said
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Kenneth Butte so consent that the motion for a
new trial as to said defendant be denied, but
otherwise granted. That notice of such order was
served upon the defendant, Kenneth Butte, on the
3rd day of March, 1939, but said Kenneth Butte
failed to consent to the increase of such verdict.
That on the 3rd day of April, 1939, defendant,
Kenneth Butte, served and filed his notice and
motion as follows:
(Title of Court and Cause)
~OTICE AND MOTION
TO THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED AND TO
H. G. METOS, HIS ATTORNEY:

YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE
TAKE NOTICE that the defendant, Kenneth
Butte, will on the 11th day of April, 1939, at the
hour of 2 o'clock P. M., or as soon thereafter as
counsel can be heard, move the court to vacate
and set aside its conditional order heretofore entered herein providing that the defendant, Butte,
shall consent that the judgment against him be increased to $2400.00 within twenty days after notice of such order or in the alternative that the
judgment against said defendant be set aside and
a new trial granted.
This motion is and will be based upon the
files, records, evidence and minutes in the above
entitled cause and the following grounds:
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1. That the court had no authority to make
such alternative order.

2. That the verdict against the defendant,

Kenneth Butte, was not insufficient.
3. That the jury having fairly upon the evi-

dence presented returned a verdict for the sum of
$800.00, the court could not set up its judgment,
opinion or feeling as against the verdict and
judgment of the jury.
4. That said order was made contrary to law.

GERALD IRVINE,
Attorney for Kenneth Butte.
127
That said motion was duly argued to the
court and denied on the 17th day of April, 1939.

Oft's. Tr.
Page

(Title of Court and Cause)
8

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS ON SECOND TRIAL
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of
May, 1939, the above entitled matter came on for
hearing before the Honorable Clarence E. Baker,
one of the judges of the above entitled court, sitting with a jury. H. G. Metos and Samuel Bern·
stein appeared as attorneys for plaintiff and Ger·
ald Irvine and Ralph T. Stewart appeared as at·
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torneys for the ddendant, whereupon the following proceedings were had:
11

MR. S l.E \\ A1{ 1 : 1 have another matter 1
might call Your Honor's attention to at this time,
and that is the order made by judge Thurman
,,;ith respect to the new trial.
Judge Thurman. on March 2, 1939, made an
order. which I am taking the substance of from
the notice served on me. not having the original
order before me. and which order read substantially as follows:
(~1\Jternative

order to increase the verdict to
$2400.00 or grant a new trial was read).
12

~ow,

it not appearing from the record In this
case that any order has been made since the expiration of twenty days, determining that consent was not given and the granting of the motion
because of the fact that such consent was not
given, we object to the case proceeding to trial,
on the ground that there is already a verdict in
this case for $800.00, and that a motion for a new
trial was not legally granted, and that therefore
there is no issue to be tried. We further object to
the case proceeding to trial as against the defendant, Kenneth Butte, only, and not as against both
defendants.
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\Ve take the position on behalf of Kenneth
Butte that his rights would be seriously prejudiced
by having this case as against him alone, tried
separately. He is put in a position where a verdict or judgment might be rendered against him
in one amount, whereas on a possible retrial as
against the defendant, Affleck, would change the
verdict-or a verdict in a different amount might
be rendered, and if. upon a subsequent trial as
against the defendant, Affleck, a verdict in excess of the amount rendered against the defendant, Kenneth Butte, was entered, the said Affleck
would have a cause of action against Butte for an
amount in excess of any judgment or verdict which
might be rendered in this case.
MR. METOS: Now, if the court please, all
those matters Mr. Stewart talked about were
ruled upon last week by Judge Thurman.
THE COURT: I will go over this between
now and 2 P. M. and reserve the ruling upon it
until that time.

17

MR ..MET OS: I don't know whether an entry
has been made, but the judge, in open court, overruled those objections.

18

THE COURT: I assume that the order indicates the objection has been ruled upon. It is
the opinion of this court that the order, without
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any further order. is binding and ubsolutl'. The
motion is. therefore. at this time Ol'nit'cl.
You may draw the jury.
MR. STEWART: There is one matter I
want to take up before commencing the examination of the jury. either now, or after the names
have been drawn. it is immaterial to me at which
time hut before the commencement of any examination.
THE COURT:
it, Mr. Stewart?

Can you state to me what it

MR. STEWART: If Your Honor please, at
this time I wish to offer in evidence Policy No.

19

AU-206787, issued by the Northwest Casualty
Company, on the 28th day of September, 1937,
and covering the period when this accident occurred, being a policy issued to D. A. Affleck,
doing business as Affleck Grocery Company. The
purpose of the introduction is to show to the court
the fact that the coverage under the policy is not
extended in this action to the defendant, Kenneth
Butte, hut is limited to persons driving the car for
purposes of Mr. Affleck; so as to advise the court,
in advance, that there is no insurance in this case,
and that it would he prejudicial to the defendant,
Kenneth Butte, if any matter relating to insurance
should he brought out in this action. It is purely
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for this purpose. and no other purpose.
MR: BERNSTEIN: If we get a judgment against
Kenneth Butte and an execution issues that is not
satisfied, and we make demand on the insurance
company, then we would have to file suit against
this insurance company, and we are entitled to
ask Your Honor, and we are going to ask Your
Honor, to ask this jury whether or not they carry
liability insurance, and we can ask the jury if
they own stock in this company. The Supreme
Court has ruled we have a right to ask this question.
MR. METOS: The court may tell the jury,
and ask them whether or not they carry liability
insurance.
MR. STEW ART: I want the paragraph to
appear in the record, and if the court rules it is
not properly there, I cannot help that,-with respect to this paragraph which I offer to read.

21

MR. STEWART: I will be glad to have the
reporter copy it, as though it had been read in the
record, this provision of paragraph 5, and particularly the last portion of it, which reads as follows:
"provided, further, that the actual use is with the
permission of the named insured."
THE COURT: Well, it may be received
solely for the purpose offered, hut at this time
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the ruling on any number of possible questions
that might he asked in regard to the question will
be ruled on hereafter. It is not an exhibit for the
jury.
MR. BERNSTEIN: I don't understand the
court has a right to admit anything in evidence
unless it is shown to the jury.

22

MR. METOS: In other words, is Your Honor
going to rule that in the event the plaintiff asks
these jurors whether they are connected with the
Northwest Casualty Company, Your Honor will
sustain an oh jection to those questions?

THE COURT:
ing at this time.
23

That is not the court's rul-

Thereupon the jurors returned to the courtroom and after examination by the court were
examined by Mr. Metos as follows:

Q: Mr. Langton, are you a stockholder or
officer or employee of the Northwest Casualty
Company of Seattle, Washington?
A.

No.

Q. Mr. James L. Wilson, are you a stockholder or officer or employee of any casualty company?
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A. No. The company I am with writes casualty insurance; that is the First Security Trust.
I have no stock in the corporation.
Q. Mr. Self, are you a stockholder-by the
way, what did you say your employment was?
A.

A salesman.

Q.

For whom?

A.

For myself.

Q. Are you a stockholder, officer or employee of the Northwest Casualty Company?

25

A.

No.

Q.

Or any casualty company?

A.

No.

Q.

Mr. Groo, where are you employed?

A. Roe's Department Store, Third South
and State.

Q. Are you a stockholder or officer or employee of the Northwest Casualty Company of
Seattle, Washington?

A.

No.

Q.

Or any other casualty company?

A.

No sir.

Q.

Mrs. Andrus,-are you married?
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A.

Yes sir.

Q.

What is your husband's business?

A.

He is a salesman at the Producers Mar-

ket.

26

Q. ~-\.re you a stockholder. officer or employee of the Northwest Casualty Company of
Seattle. "' ashington?
_-\. ,\ly husband just bought a car, and he
·would have insurance. but I don't think it is that
company.

Q.

,\Ir. McCowan, what is your occupation?

A. I am the district manager of the Libby,
:\:fcNeil & Company-food products.
Q. Are you a stockholder or officer or employee of the Northwest Casualty Company of
Seattle, Washington.

27

A.

No sir.

Q.

Or any other casualty company?

A.

No.

Q.

Mr. Lalliss, are you, yourself, employed?

A.

Yes.

Q. Are you a stockholder or officer or employee of the Northwest Casualty Company of
Seattle, Washington?
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A.

Q.
A.

No sir.
Or any other company?
No.

Q.

Mr. Booth, do you drive an automobile?

A.

f have driven one, but T haven't a car

Q.

You say you work for the U.S. Smelter?

A.

T am a tailor, I make the bags.

now.

Q.

Are you a stockholder or officer or employee of the Northwest Casualty Company of
Seattle, Washington?

A.

No sir.

Q.

Or any other casualty company?

A.

No sir.

Q.

Mr. Timothy, do you own an automobile,
and drive it?

28

A.

I do.

Q.

You are a musician?

A.

Yes.

Q.

For whom do you work?

A.

I work for myself.

Q. Are you an officer or employee or stockholder of the Northwest Casualty Company of
Seattle, Washington?
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A.

No sir.

Q.

Or any other casualty company?

A.

No sir.

Q.

EYer been involved in any kind of a
case where suit was brought against you, or you
brought suit against somebody else?

A.

No sir.

Q. Are you an officer, stockholder or employee of the Northwest Casualty Company of
Seattle. 'Vashington?
A.

No sir.

Q.

Or any other casualty company?

A.

No sir.

Q. Mrs. Westwood, you say you work as a
bookkeeper for John Holley?

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

What business is that company engaged

A.
cheese.

Wholesaling of poultry, butter, eggs and

in?
29

Q.

Are you married.

A.

Yes.

Q.

What does your husband do?
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A.

He Is a mechanic down at the County

Shops.

Q. Are you an officer. stockholder or employee of the Northwest Casualty Company?
A.

No sir.

Q. Or any other kind of casualty company
which insures automobiles?
A.

No sir.

Q. Mr. Ray. you say you are working for
a printing company?

30

A.

I am a part owner.

Q.

That is with what company?

A.

The Acorn Printing Company.

Q. Are you an officer, stockholder or an
employee of the Northwest Casualty Company?
A.

No sir.

Q. Or any other kind of a casualty company which insures automobiles?
A.

No sir.

Q. Mrs. Williams, I understand you are a
housewife?
A.

Yes sir.

Q.

What does your husband do?
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A.

I am a widow.

Q.

\\'hat did your husband do?

A. He was running the elevator here in the
County Building.

Q.

\Vas that Thomas \Villiams?

A.

Yes sir.

Q. A.re you an officer, employee, or a stockholder of any casualty company that carries insurance on automobiles.
A.
31

No sir.

Q. Mr. Nalder, do I understand right now
you are not employed?
A.

No.

Q. What was your business when you were
employed, what did you do?
A.

I was a groceryman.

Q.

Was that for yourself?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you a stockholder in any insurance
-casualty insurance company, that carries insurance on automobiles?

A.
33

No.

At the conclusion of the examination of the
jury by plaintiff's counsel and before questioning
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of the jurors by defendant's counsel, the ,jury
was excused from ·the courtroom and the following proceedings were had:

34

MR. STEW ART: At this time, if Your
Honor please, in view of the interrogation of the
jury, the defendant, at this time, moves that this
jury be discharged, and that a new jury be called
to try this case, because of the prejudicial misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in specifically asking each and every one of the jurors as to whether
or not they were officers, agents, employees or
stockholders of the Northwest Casualty Company,
or any other insurance company, particularly by
reason of asking such questions of John Self, who
is a salesman, working for himself, and who does
not drive an automobile, and particularly by asking the question of Virgil Groo, likewise a salesman, who indicated by his prior answer that
he would be unlikely to have such a position; of
asking such similar questions-identical questions
of Charity Andrus, a housewife, whose husband
works at the Producers Market, and who testified
that she was a housewife, living at 138 East 7th
South Street, and by asking the same question of
Mr. McCowan, and asking the same question of
Charles J. Lallis, and of asking the same question of Merines M. Otten, 963 West 2nd South
Street, formerly a shoe repairer, and not now
working at any occupation, and, therefore, could
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not be employed by such a concern: of asking the
same question of Laura Willinms. widow of
Thomas "~illiams. who. for years. was an elevator operator in this building. and herself is a
housewife and unemployed: of asking the same
question of Richard ,V. Ray, co-owner of the
Acorn Printing Company: asking the same question of Mrs. Edith Westwood, a housewife, who
had previously stated that she worked for John
Holley, and that her husband was employed in
the Salt Lake County Shops, and who could,
therefore, have no connection with an insurance
company; of asking the same question of Dan H.
Nalder, who had previously testified that he was
unemployed, and, therefore, could not have been
an employee of such a concern. Of asking the
same question of Evan Timothy, of 812 East 5th
South, who had previously testified that he was
a music teacher-I think he said the violin and
accordion-and he could not, therefore, have been
such an employee of such company; and of asking the same question of John T. Booth.

35

And it clearly and definitely appearing, from
the nature of the examination, and the method
followed in pursuing it, as well as from the statements made by counsel in the court's presence,
before the jury was sworn and examined, that
these questions, in view of the nature of the jurors,
their businesses and connections-three of them,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Dffs. Tr.
Page

at least, being housewives, would make it impossible to conceive that such questions were asked in good faith for the purpose of determining
either that the jury would be subject to challenge
for cause or on peremptory challenges, and in
view of the examination, and in view of the record
that I previously made to Your Honor, it is my
opinion that the defendant, Kenneth Butte, could
not have a fair and impartial trial before this
jury; that the questions were asked in such a
manner as to directly suggest the existence of insurance in this case, when, as a matter of fact,
there is no insurance protection, and we feel that
it is imperative that this jury be discharged.
THE COURT:
denied.

The motion last made is

Thereupon the jurors were recalled to the
courtroom and eight jurors sworn to try the case.
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G. M. HOPKINS, a witness called on behalf
of the plaintiff, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
My name is G. M. Hopkins and I am a
traffic investigator for the Salt Lake Police Department and was such an officer on the 27th
day of January, 1938. I was called to Third Avenue and K Street on that day at about 1:30 P.M.
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to investigate an an·ident. I drovt• direetly to
Third Avenue and K. Street, arriving· within about
four minutes after the call. I seen two ears that
apparently had been in an uceidcnt and proceeded to make my usual inYe~tigation. examining both cars with reference to their positions on
the street. also the surrounding conditions. I took
measurements and made a rough sketch of what
I saw. \\'ith reference to my sketch I can place
on the blackboard the measurements and markings that I saw.
Figure number 1 represents a truck, the grocery delivery truck, which was lying on its left
side on the northeast corner of the intersection.
It was facing east on the left side in the center
of the intersection, that is, in the center of K
Street and right on the crosswalk was a Ford
Coupe. I will mark that 2. We also found on the
east part of the intersection one long tire mark
which had been burned by a tire skidding, with a
length of 36 feet, and at the termination of that
mark was debris and glass on the street. Starting
from the west side of the spot where the debris
was, were two tire burns leading right over to
the truck which was lying on its side. The width
of these tire burns was 3?' feet. From a point
which started to the point which stopped at the
truck further up on the corner of the intersection
is a tree about 16 or 18 inches in diameter, which
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sets 15 feet north of the crosswalk. There was
grass in the parking between the sidewalk-these
lines represent the sidewalk-there was grass in
here. And across that grass there up to that tree
was two tire marks, tearing the grass out, showing the car went up there. Then there was tire
marks leading right back to the Ford coupe. We
found the truck damaged on the front end more on
the left front side, and the Ford coupe was damaged on the right side slightly to the rear of the
center. The visibility was good, it was a clear
day. The width of Third Avenue was 45 feet and
K Street is 40 feet wide at the south and 45 feet
wide at the north. The truck mark commenced
23 feet east of the east curb line.

Q. Now, officer, did you go down on K
Street and look over towards Third Avenue?
MR. STEW ART: I make the further objection there is no proper foundation laid. No
showing that the condition and visibility was the
same, or there were no obstructions at the time
the accident occurred which were not present when
the witness made the observation, which would
affect the distance or the position or the visibility
that he might undertake to testify to.
44
Q. Well, officer, did you make the observation that I asked you, about how far you could see
over
on Third A venue from K Street?
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MR. STEWART:

just answer that yes or

no.

A.

Yes.

Q. All right now. assuming that there were
no obstructions at the scene of the accident, about
how far could you see from K Street over on
Third A venue.
~lR. STE\VA.Rl:
We object to that as containing an improper assumption. This witness
cannot assume there were no cars there.

THE COlJRT:

The objection is overruled .

.MR. STE\V.A..H.f: 1 make the further objection It IS mcompetent, irrelevant and immaterial,
there is no proper foundation laid. Calling upon a
witness to give evidence based upon an assumptio~ which neither he nor counsel has any right
to include in such a question.
THE COURT:

The obJection is overruled.

MR. STEWART: I make the further objection that the question, if answered, would have no
probative value, there being no position fixed, and
no basis to make it of any materiality.
THE COURT:

The obJection is overruled.
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A. From a point 8 feet south of the south
curb line of Third Avenue.

Q.

Will you put a point to designate that?

MR. STEWART: Now, may my objection
go to all this line of examination, or to all of the
questions, that it is incompetent, irr~levant, immaterial, and no foundation laid, and these answers are all based upon an assumption not apJ
pearing in the record?
THE COURT:

You may have your objec-

tion.

Q.

To each question and each answer?
THE COURT: Yes.

46

Q.

Go ahead, Mr. Hopkins.

MR. STEWART: Now I object to the witness making any marks upon the map showing
any imaginary position or positions taken by
him in making any observation or placing any
distances or markings upon the map, relating to
such positions, and I base my objection upon the
same ground that I have heretofore indicated with
respect to this line of examination.
THE COURT:

The objection is overruled.
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A. From a point 80 feet south of the imaginary curb line of Third Avenue to the centet·
of K Street, a point being 80 feet down. taking
80 feet east of the east curb line of the center of
Third AvenueMR. STE"\\TART: Now may the record show
that over my objection the witness is proceeding
to draw an imaginary line from a point in the
center of K Street south of Third Avenue to a
point in the center of L Street east of K Street?
THE COURT:

It may so show.

And that the line is being

MR. STEWART:

dra"'-n over my objection.
THE COURT:

I think it shows that, Mr.

Stewart.
A.

From a point 80 feet south of the Third

Avenue curb line to the south side of Third Avenue, you could see to a point 80 feet east of the
east curb line of K Street. I stood at that point
47

to see how far east I could see on Third Avenue and I could see from there to there. The skid
mark on Third Avenue curved slightly to the
north near the end of it.
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CROSS-EXAl\HNATIOJ\'
The sketch, Exhibit "C," is not a sketch that
I made at the scene of the accident. I made it
down at the police station. The marks on the blackhoard are copied substantially from Exhibit "C."
Independently of my record I don't purport to
remember what I see in each particular accident.
The only thing that I can do is refer to my record.
These skid marks identified by A, B were tire
burns by a tire skidding sideways. The tire marks
to the wheels of the truck are the way that the
marks led as I saw them and put them on my report. I don't know how they were made at the
time, by the front or the rear wheels. There was
quite a little hit of debris and I made my measurements as nearly as I could from the center of it.
It was about 45 feet from the debris to the tree
identified with the letter T. An automobile traveling at a speed of 25 miles an hour travels about 36
feet per second and at 20 miles an hour travels
about 29 feet a second. The 36 foot line XY curved
slightly to the north near the west end. I would
say that the west end extended three or four feet
farther north than the east end. I would say between two and three feet. Third Avenue is slight-

ly down hill and a car going westerly would be
going down a slight grade. A car going up K
Street would he going up grade. There were no
tire marks or skid marks on K Street south of point
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X where the debris was. There were no marks
showing any gripping of tires on K Street. When
I arrived at the scene of the aceident the Ford
coupe was at point 2. Mr. Franz was there and
I asked him if that was where the car stopped
after the accident and he said yes. He told me
that his car stopped at the point marked point 2
and that is where his car came to a stop. And I
saw marks from point X to point C and tire
marks from point C, which is a 16 inch tree, back
to the center of K Street. There were tire marks
from point X from the curb and there were these
heavy marks where the grass was dug up and
there were tire marks that led back from the curb
to the car at point 2 and I could see marks from
point X to point C.
Q. Did you ask Mr. Franz how his car got
from point X to point C and hack to point 2 7
MR. BERNSTEIN:

We object to this as im-

materiaL
THE COURT:
MR. STEW ART:
56

The objection is sustained.
Exception.

A car will stop more quickly going up hill
than going down. K Street is asphalt, black top
pavement and gives a 60 to 70 per cent coefficient
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breaking surface. Photograph, defendant's Exhibit 2, resembles the intersection. It appears to
be the same street. It appears to be the same as
it was prior to the accident. There is no debris
shown in the picture. Defendant's Exhibit 3 fairly represents the intersection looking south on
K Street from a point north of Third Avenue. On
Exhibit 3 there appear to be several marks shaped
similar to the marks on the road but I wouldn't
say they are tire marks because I don't know.
I see marks on Exhibit 3 in the general locality of
where I saw the marks on the road. I should judge
it is a photograph of it. I see a line on the left
side of Exhibit 3 commencing at a point east of
the curb line and proceeding to the center of K
Street. It would seem to be in approximately the
same position as the 36 feet line between point X
andY on the map. Exhibit 2 is a fair representation
of the appearance of K Street looking north from
Third A venue. I went down K Street 80 feet
south of the south curb line of Third Avenue and
at no place between there and point X was there
any indication of application of brakes or the
pressure of tires gripping upon the highway.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION
What I mean by that was that as a result
of the collision the truck was damaged on the
left front, showing that the collision happened on
the left front of the truck. It was more on the left
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front of the car at the eorner. It uppeart'd that the
force of the impact came toward the left front
corner.
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ERNEST H. CHRISTENSEN, called on behalf of the plaintiff. testified as follows:
My name is Ernest H. Christensen and I am
a police officer and I am the police officer who
assisted Mr. Hopkins at the intersection of Third
Avenue and K. Street January 27, 1938. I took
some photographs at the scene of the accident. I
held the tape and officer Hopkins put down the
measurements.
GERALD A. FRANZ, called on behalf of the
plaintiff, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:

70

My name is Gerald A. Franz and I live at
50 North Fifth West, Salt Lake City. I am a
stage driver for the Union Pacific Stages, and
was very well acquainted with S. G. Saltas, having known him several years. He was with me
on January 27th in a Ford VB. I was driving the
car and he was sitting on my right. As we approached Third Avenue on K Street I shifted into
second gear and drove in the center. As I entered
the intersection I looked in both directions and
did not notice anything coming. Drove towards
the center of the street approximately two feet
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from the center line and the truck hit me on the
right side towards the rear of the car. We were
both thrown out. I was driving possibly between
15 and 20 miles an hour. When I approached the
intersection I looked both ways, both east and
west. When we got about just over the imaginary
line of the intersection this truck hit me on the
right side. I shifted into second gear to prevent
lugging the motor. It would run better in second
gear than third and I was going up hill. I noticed the truck about the moment it hit me, just
about - it was possibly within 20 feet of me,
or 15,- before it hit me. I was approximately 60
or 80 feet south of the south line of the intersection when I put my car in second gear. As I entered the intersection I made an observation in
both directions, east and west, and couldn't see
anything coming. I was about 15 or 20 feet south
of the north side of Third A venue when the truck
hit me. Mark X represents my automobile. It is
marked 2. Mark 1 represents the truck.
After the noon recess Mr. Franz further
testified as follows:
As I neared the intersection just over the
the imaginary line I first saw the car, which was
probably 100 or 110 feet up the road east of the
intersection, east of the south imaginary line of
the intersection. I continued on across the inter-
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section and at a point near the eenter of the intersection I saw this truck over here about 20
or 25 feet. It was then I thought I would be hit
and I started in this direction towards the left.
'78

MR. METOS: Now, Mr. Franz, how far
north ·were you of the south line-imaginary line
-when you first observed the truck, when you
were going up north?
~1R. STE,VART:
I object to that as repetittious. The witness just a moment ago pointed to
the south imaginary line on the south side of
Third Avenue.

MR. MET OS: What I want to do is to just
indicate with a dot approximately where he was.
'79

MR. METOS: Now can you state how
many feet you were south or north of this lineimaginary line, when you saw that truck?
MR. STEWART: I object to that; it appearing that he put the mark of his automobile
right on the imaginary line. Counsel is trying
to get him to put it one way or the other. He put
it directly on the south curb line of Third Avenue.
MR. MET OS: So far as I am concerned,
Your Honor, if he wants to leave that car at that
point there is no objection to that.
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MR. STEW ART:
witness.

I want to leave it to the

THE COURT: I think he may state the
number of feet, if he wants to.
81

[ had met Mr. Saltas in the Union Pacific
Garage. We drove around on the east side of
town, went down to Thirteenth South and hack on
Ninth East.

82

Q. You haven't any claim against the defendant in this case, of any kind?
A. No sir, that was taken care ofMR. STEWART: Just a moment. I take an
exception to counsel asking the question of the
witness, and answering before I can make an objection, and assign it as misconduct on the part
of counsel and ask the court to discharge the
jury. The witness started to answer and then answered the question before I had a chance to object.
MR. METOS:
MR. STEW ART:

He didn't answer it, I think.
He answered enough of it.

MR. MET OS: I don't want any error in this
record. It may go out.
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MR. STEW ART:
it is then too late.
THE COURT:

After you brought it out,

Read the question.

MR. STEWART: just a moment. I don't
want the answer read right in the presence of the
jury.
83

THE COURT: Mr. Reporter, will you
please read the answer and the question.
(Question and answer read to the court)
MR. STEWART: I take an exception to the
question and answer being read.
THE COURT:

The motion is denied.

MR. BERNSTEIN: May the record show
the question and answer was read to the court
and not within the hearing of the jury?
MR. STEWART: The question and answer
was read so that I could hear the question read
by the reporter.
THE COURT: The record may show the
reporter read it so the court could only hear it.
The court isn't advised as to whether the jury
heard it.
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MR. STEWART:

I take an exception to the

ruling of the court.
84
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CROSS-EXAMINATION:
During the recess Mr. Metos talked with me
for a few minutes. Mr. Metos took the transcript
of the testimony in the former case and called my
attention to the fact that on the previous trial
I had testified that I saw the truck when it was
100 to 110 feet east. He called my attention to
that distance and when I got on the stand this
afternoon I corrected my testimony. The automobile which [ was driving was in good condition
and had good brakes. It was a Ford V8 and had
good power, as good as the average Ford. There
was no particular reason for our going for the
ride. We drove around town possibly an hour.
As I remember we came up Ninth East to South
Temple and then turned up K Street. In driving
up K Street I don't believe we had any point picked
out. We were just driving. We just turned up K
Street on a pleasure drive. I have had a lot of experience driving heavy equipment. The grade
on K Street was about four per cent. A four per
cent grade isn't very steep. I don't know whether
any modern car will gain speed on a six to eight
per cent grade. The rear end of my car was approximately on the extended line of the south
curb of Third A venue when I first saw the truck
coming. When the rear end of my car was about
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at the south curb of Third Avenue this truck was
approximately 100 to 110 feet east of the east
curn line of K Street. That is my judgment. l
don't know whether Third Avenue is about 45
feet wide. As near as I can guess my car traveled
a distance of between 20 and 25 feet, not to exceed 30 feet, while the other car went a distance
of between 100 and 110.

Q. Now, did you make the following answer this morning: "We proceeded into the intersection, and when we got about just over the
imaginary center line of the intersection this
truck hit me at the rear of the door, on the right
side of the coupe,.'?
Q. Now, did you-1 want
to read you this question and answer-tell me if
this is what you testified to this morning:
"Q.
(By Mr. Metos) Now while you were crossing the
intersection did you see the truck?
A. I noticed it about the moment it hit me, just aboutit was possibly within 20 feet of me or 15 feet
before it hit me." Is that what you answered this
morning?
A.

That was the answer I was confused

on. That is when, at least, I thought I would h~
hit. Before, when I saw it, I didn't have any idea
that I would he hit. I felt safe in going across the
street.
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Q. So that you first testified that when
you first saw the truck it was within 15 or 20
feet of you, and then later voluntarily changed
thai to read 15 or 20 feet east of the east curb line
of K Street, didn't you?

A.

That is right. That is what I was trying to correct, and I couldn't get it straightened.
You wouldn't give me a chance.

Q. Now you want to correct it a third time,
after Mr. Metos called your attention to the transcript, and want to say it was about 100 or 120 feet
when you first saw it. It that right?
A.

That is right.

Q. You remember testifying at the other
trial, don't you?

A.
95

Yes.

Q. Do you remember being asked, in the
other trial, where your car was when you first
saw the truck, do you remember that? Do you
remember that question being asked?
A.

No I don't.

Q.

Do you remember in the other trial testi-
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fying that the first time you saw the other truck
was when you were about in the center of Third
Avenue?
A.

1 don't remember it.

Q.

Let me ask you if you recall these questions-page 42. Do you remember making this
answer: ··~-\..s I got into the intersection I noticed
a truck approaching from the east going west. It
seemed I was far enough across the intersection. I
was practically in the center of the intersection at
the time I saw the truck." Do you remember
making that statement?
A.

Something to that effect

Q. Now do you remember this: "Q. And
when you saw it approximately how far was it
east? A. I should judge about 100 feet." Is that
what you testified to in the other trial?
A.

Something like that, yes.

Q.

Did you testify at the other trial that
you tried to beat it across the intersection?
A.

I think I used the word "beat," but

that wasn't the right word.

96

MR. STEWART:

I will go to the next one.
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Q. Did you testify, at the other trial: "and I
believed I could beat it across the intersection."
Did you so testify at the other trial?
A.

I think so.

Q. And you didn't ever put on your brakes,
did you?
A.

No.

Q.

And you didn't even try to stop?

A.

No I didn't.

Q. Going in a Ford coupe up the grade
that you were going on K Street, at between 15
and 20 miles an hour, you could have stopped it
in 15 feet, couldn't you?

97

A.

I think so.

Q.

Now did you testify as follows at the

other trial: 45. Tn answer to this question "Will
you point out on this map here where you were
when you saw the other car on the east. A.

I

was about here. This portion here." You were
pointing at the map. "It was about there, practically in the center." Did you so testify?
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don't remember.

Q. Now, did you make this further statement at the other trial: .. After I got into the intersection where I indicated there I saw this
truck coming possibly 100 or 110 feet up on the
east side of the intersection." Did you say that?
A.

100

Possibly so,

I believe so.

Q. And the place that you indicated there
was the point that you fixed, substantially in the
center of the intersection. That is true, isn't it?
A. I believe so, hut then, if I could draw
it in proportion to the street it would he a little
larger than that.
MR. METOS: I object to that, Your Honor,
because the answer read from the transcript there
doesn't show that he referred to another map, that
is not in evidence. It only tends to confuse the
witness here and the jury and the court. The
witness has testified, two or three times, where
he was when he first saw it. I think it is repetitious in addition to being confusing.
MR. STEWART: Let's see if it is confusing.
Let's go to page 51 of the transcript, Mr. Metos.
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MR. MET OS:

101

All right.

Q. Answer this question: "Q. And never,
at any time prior to reaching a point approximately in the center of Third A venue, did you see the
truck coming west. A. No I did not." Did you
so answer that question at the other trial?

A. I believe I did, hut, Mr. Stewart, I would
only he 10 feet f'rom the center if I was on the
imaginary line.
Q. At the other trial here-at the other
trial did you say that never at any time prior to
reaching a point approximately in the center of
the intersection did you see the other car, and
why, today, did you say you saw it when you
were at the south side of the intersection? This
place?

A.

I think J said, in the other trial, when
it was nearly at the center. This would he within 10 feet of the center.

Q. Do you remember coming into my office
and talking to me?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you at that time, in my office, tell
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me that you never saw the truck until the instant
of the impact.
A. I was m your office. but I didn't tell
you that.
102

Q. Did you testify at the other trial, and
did you make answer to this question: "Q. How
far did your car travel while the other car was
going 100 feet? A. Probably 10 or 12 feet." Did
you make that answer at the other trial?
A.

I answered a question like that.

103

The view east on Third Avenue wasn't obstructed by the store. There was nothing north of
the store to obstruct my view. The accident occurred in January and there were no leaves on
the trees. When I reached the point on K Street
just above the figure 40 I looked east. At that
time I couldn't see a block and a half east.

104

Q. All right, you knew, as you approached
Third A venue that it was your duty to yield the
right of way to a driver approaching from the
right if the car was approaching as close to the
intersection as you were?
MR. METOS: I object to that on the ground
that that is calling for a legal conclusion.
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IH.E COLJK1:

!he objection is sustained.

As far as I know my car stopped where the
map is marked with the figure 2 and I told that
to officer Christensen. I never did see the other
car until J was within 10 feet of the center of the
intersection. The front end of my car was at
least 15 feet into the intersection. That was the
first time T saw the westbound truck.
W. KALE, a "vitness on behalf of the plaintiff, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
I live at 752 First A venue and am a guard at
the Veterans' Administration. On January 27, 1938,

t 11

I lived at 829 Fifth Avenue. The Affleck truck
passed me at L Street and Third Avenue going
in the same direction. I was traveling about 15

112

miles an hour. It is my judgment the truck was
going between 45 and 50 miles an hour. I could

113

not say how far I was between L and K Street

114

when the crash occurred. I don't know how far I
was from the east curb of K Street when I heard
the crash. My best idea would be that I was one-

115

third of the way from K Street. I stopped right
along-there was a truck along the north side
and I was back of it.
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117

118

119

121

CROSS-EXAMiNATION
I had a broken spring on my cur and was
driving slowly to take my car to have it fixed.
My little three year old girl was with me. I had
been driving very carefully. I couldn't have been
much past L Street when the truck passed me. J
heard the crash and then glanced up and saw
it. I didn't exactly see the collision but saw it
after it happened. I was just riding down the
street and wasn't following the truck with my
eyes as it went past. It just passed like any other
car would pass. I didn't follow it as it proceeded
all the way to K Street. When I heard the crash
I didn't look at the side of the road to see just
how far I was down the block. I didn't undertake
to measure the distance that my car traveled
or exactly where it was when I heard the crash.
ALTON BUNNELL, a witness on behalf of
the plaintiff, testified as follows.
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
My name is Alton Bunnell and I live at 135
Major Street. On January 27, 1938, I lived at
740 Third Avenue. I am 17 years of age and have
driven an automobile. On January 27th around

122

1 o'clock I saw the Affleck truck going west on

Third A venue. I was sitting in the front room on
the sofa looking out the window. Our house was
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located on the southwest corner of Third A venue
and L Street.

123

Q.

Have you a judgment as to the speed

of the truck?

MR. STEW ART:

I object to the question as
being no proper foundation laid, the witness not
being qualified as to speed, to express an opinion.
THE COURT: He may answer the question.
A.

Yes.

Q. And in your judgment how fast was the
truck going west at the time you saw it?
MR. STEWART: We object to that as he~
ing incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, no
proper foundation having been laid. The testimony as to the speed at the place where this witness saw it would not have any relevancy in connection with an accident occurring one block
west, and, if the court has any doubt, I would
like to argue the law. The theory of my objection
is that there was no presumption that a car will
continue at the same rate of speed and will not
slow down at a subsequent crossing, and, furthermore, that the witness has not testified that he
124

watched it after it left L Street, and as it proceeded toward K, and under these circumstances
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he would be unable to express an opinion as to
the speed which the car might have been going
when it reached K Street.
THE COURT: The objection IS overruled.
A. I would say it was going at least 45
miles an hour.
126
12?

129

130

CROSS-EXAMINATION
I had turned 16 in October before the accident. From the north side of the store to the
curb would be nearly 16 feet. I was sitting on the
sofa looking out the window. As I glanced out
the window I saw the truck coming. I observed
the D. A. Affleck sign. At the other trial I testified it was going at least 40 miles an hour. I was
sitting on the south side of the sofa kinda facing
northeast on the end of the sofa away from the
window, about five feet from the window. I
didn't see it after it passed beyond the point where
my eyes were looking through the window.
MR. METOS: Are you willing to stipulate
that the deceased, S. G. Saltas, was thirty year~
of age at the time of the accident?
MR. STEWART:
age was.

I don't know what his

MR. METOS: And had a life expectancy of
thirty-five years and three months?
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MR. STEW ART:
age was.

I don't know what his

MR. METOS: That is what we allege in our
complaint and that is what we will prove.
MR. ST'EW ART:
ulate.

1 will he willing to stip-

MR. METOS: Assuming he was thirty years
of age. That is what he was.
MR. STEWART: The only limitation of
such stipulation would he this: That, in this particular case, where a father is suing for the death
of an adult child, and where the father's age is
such as it is in this case, that the American Mortality Table would not he applicable and the
cause of action would he solely for the benefit of
the father on the basis of any contemplated damages. If he personally would receive it it would
make the mortality table ineffective.
MR. MET OS: Are you willing to stipulate
that the mortality table is evidence, and let the
court rule on it?
MR. STEWART: I will stipulate that the
mortality table is as you stated, thirty-five years
and three months. It is absolutely incompetent,
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irrelevant and immaterial. and we particularly
object to it being received in evidence in this case.
131

MR. METOS:

The plaintiff's age is 60 years.

THE COURT: Well, it apparently has some
probative value in connection with all the evidence in the case, the objection will be over-

ruled.
132

THE COURT: The objection to the admission of the American Experience Table of Mortality showing the expectancy of life of the deceased to be thirty-five years and three months,
is overruled.
GEORGE SALT AS, plaintiff, testified as follows:

133

134

135

DIRECT EXAMINATION:
My name is George Saltas and I live in Bingham. I have lived there thirteen years. Spero
Saltas was my son and was 30 years old. I am
a widower. Spero Saltas was not married. My
wife is dead. I have five children living with me.
I had eight children hut have got seven now. My
son was working at the time of his death. He was
working at the Utah Copper for $5.85 a day. He
worked every day. He had been working for
twelve years. He lived with me all the time, all
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137
138
139

140
141

144
145

his life. He Jived at the same house with me in
Copperfield. He helped me out all the time. He
helped me raise my family. Anything I ever
asked him he give me. I am not in good health.
r have been in Bingham since 1907 and after I
go to Idaho for seven years about. Every winter
came in Bingham and worked again, worked in
Bingham. In Idaho I farmed. Spero worked on
the farm. He went to school to the eighth grade
and then started working. Spero turned over
money to me. He gave me about $100 a month. He
paid the rent. He paid the rent because Utah
Copper charge it to the check. Spero paid the
rent from 1927 when he started to get his check
along about '27, eight years. Utah Copper work
this way, it was for the days work. I work three
days over for Spero and Utah Copper take three
days rent. They take it from my check, take three
days rent for time Spero started to pay the rent.
Utah Copper started to take rent off my son's
check in 1934. My son had an automobile. During the depression Spero worked ten to thirteen
days a month. From '31-'30 to '33 he worked
ten to thirteen days: $3.80 a day.
CROSS-EXAMINATION:
I have been working in Bingham approxi~
mately thirty years. I am working for the Utah
Copper. Except when I operated the farm in
Idaho I worked either for the Utah Copper or the
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U. S. Mines. I eurn $4.23 a duy. 1 um working
twenty-two days a month. I have been earning
$4.25 a day for a substantial time. Two years
ago I worked thirty days a month. In 1937 Spero
took a vacation to California. He went to Yellowstone Park. I haYe a boy Paul and a boy Pete.
Paul has been working about three years and
makes $5.00 a day. Pete has been working pretty
close to two years and a half.

Q.

And how much does Pete earn?

MR. METOS: Just a minute. I ~bject to
that on the ground it is immaterial, irrelevant and
incompetent and not within the issues of this
case. It doesn't go to any issue.
THE COURT:
MR. STEWART:
148

The objection is sustained.
Exception.

Paul was living at home and still lives at
home and is still working. Pete was living at home
a year ago. He left home now about a month
ago he go out of the home. He was living at
home before and for some time after Spero's
death.

Q. Now, between you and Paul and Pete,
at the time of Spero's death, you were earning
about $13.00 a day, were you not?
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MR. METOS:
object to that as immaterial and irrelevent and incompetent and entirely
prejudicial. I never asked this witness if they made
any money or contributed anything to him.
THE COURT:

149

151

153
154

1?6Y2

The objection is sustained.

About a year ago Paul pay his hoard and
sometimes he give a dollar or two at home and
when Pete was working he paid hoard. Spero did
not pay hoard. When I work at present time the
rent deducted out of his check, and if I work three
days over for Spero, Utah Copper CompanyUtah Copper wants to collect other days, more
rent, because I pay some for the days I work,
so it makes it twenty days a month, and they pay
twenty days rent. I paid part of the rent. I have
a married daughter. My children are pretty well
grown up. Pete hoards some place in boarding
house down in Bingham. The car was for the
whole family. It belonged to the whole family.
Paul and Pete lend the money to Spero. Pete
works for the Utah Copper. I am past 62 last
November. I now pay rent for the number of
days I work. I pay 90c a day. If I work twentyfive days then I pay full rent. If I work twentytwo days I pay $19.80.

Q.

Mr. Saltas, for some months prior to
Spero's death, didn't he live at what is known as
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Cyprus Hall?
A.

Yes sir.

Q.

How long did he live at Cyprus Hall?

A.

I don't remember.

Q.

Well, about how long?

A.

Two

O:f

7

three months. I don t remem-

her.
Q. Well, it that your best recollection, two
or three months?
A.

I can't understand that.

Q. Is that your best recollection, two or
three months. Didn't he live there longer than
that?
177

A.

I can't understand at all what you mean.

Q. Now, didn't your son Paul pay the rent
to the Utah Copper Company for several months?
A.

May I explain it better?

Q. You can answer my question. Didn't
your son pay the rent for several months?
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MR. STEWART:
A.

During the year 1937?

Yes; I asked if I could explain how he

did.

Q. Didn't they deduct from his wages several months?

A.

Paul pay the rent right now. I been
sick. Since 1935 Utah Copper wants to collect the
rent, and so I now work, and turn the rent to
Paul and Paul figure up the rent.
Q. Now, just a minute. I am not talking
about 1935 at all. When you were sick-you were
working in 193?, weren't you?

178

A.

Yes.

Q.

Didn't Spero live at Cyprus Hall?

A.

Not in '37.

Q.

Not in '3??

A.

No.

Didn't Paul pay part of the rent in 1937?
A. Not pay rent at all. He just charge the
Utah Copper with his check. He charge it with
his board. Not pay any.
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Q.

But the rent was deducted from Paurs

check?
A.

But I paid,-charge to him-

Q.

Will you please answer my question?

A. But he pay rent-not pay rent. I pay
rent. He pay his hoard, and pay-because rent is
$30.00, and he pay some days for the hoard, not
pay the rent.

Q. Or at least part of it deducted from
Paul's pay check. Now, answer that question .. ·
A.

Charge to his check.

Q. No~, just a minute. It was charged to
his check, wasn't it?
A.
179

Yes sir.

Q. And while Spero was living at Cyprus
Hall wasn't the coal hill deducted from Spero's
check, and the rent deducted from Paul's?
A.

They, they not-

Q. Now, during 1937, before January of
1938, wasn't the rent deducted from Paul's check?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

And wasn't the coal deducted

from

Spero's?

180

246
247

A.

At that time coal was charged to Spero.

Q.

Do you know Mr. Watson?

A.

Mr. who?

Q.

Mr. A. W. Watson at Bingham?

A.

Yes, he is at the Utah Copper.

Q. Now, I asked you the other day about
Spero living at Cyprus Hall?
A.

Yes sir.

Q.

Was he living at home in 1935 and 1936?

A. I don't remember exactly. It was '35 or
'36 he lived at Cyprus.

Q.

You remember you said something about
his living at Cyprus Hall for two or three months?
A.

About that time, yes.

Q. Now, isn't it a fact that he lived in
Cyprus Hall from the 1st day of April, 1935, to
the 10th day of March, 1936, a period of thirteen
months and ten days?
A.

No, that is not true.
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Q.

Are you sure?

A. 1 am sure. because l don't remember so
long. Besides. too. he wants to go.
Q.

I am asking you for a date.

A.

I don't remember exactly how long.

Q. Now, you are sure he didn't live there
thirteen months?

A.

I am not sure.

Q.

What is that?

A.

I am not sure how long he lived, I don't

remember.

Q.
1934?

248

Did Spero pay any rent to December 1,

A.

To December when?

Q.

To December 1, 1934?

A.

No.

Q.

What is that?

A.

No sir.

Q. Isn't it a fact that you paid all the
rent from December 1, 1934, to December 31, 1935?
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A.

Yes sir.

Q. And isn't it a fact that Paul paid all
the rent from December 1, 1935, to the present
time?
A.

I want to explain this.

Q.

Just answer this question. Isn't it a fact?

A.

I no answer this question because I got
to explain. I refuse to answer.
THE COURT: Yes, you are required, Mr.
Saltas, to answer the question.
A. It was this different way with him so
that he charge it to his check.
A.

Why won't you let me explain?

THE COURT: The explanation will be
called for by your own attorney afterwards, if
he desires to do so.
249

A.

Charge to his check.

Q.

It was charged to Paul's check?

A.

Yes.
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Q. And charged to his check. including
January 1, 1936?
A.

Yes sir.

Q. So that during all of 1936 and 193?', the
rent was taken out of Paul's check?
A.

Yes sir: but charged to him.

Q. Let me make this clear, isn't it a fact
that there has been no rent deducted by the Utah
Copper Company from Spero's check?
A.

No sir.

Q.

Since November, 1934?

A.

Yes, that is to him.

Q. Let me see if you understand the question. Prior to December, that is, before December?
A.

Before December, 1934, charged to Spero.

Q.

Yes; now since that time none of it has
been charged to Spero?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you mean that?
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A. Charged to 1) au1, charged to me, with
my name, December, 1934, charged to Spero in
1935, I been sick.
250

Q.

ln 1934, to November, it was charged

to Spero, wasn't it?

A.

Yes.

Q. Ano since December 1, 1934, no renthas been charged to Spero?
A.

No.

Q.

That 1s right, isn't it?

A.

Yes.

Q. And since December 1, 1934, Spero has
worked for the Utah Copper Company?
A.

Yes sir.

Q.

And from December 1, 1934, to December 31, 1935, the rent was all charged to you?
A.

Yes sir.

Q. And since December 31, 1935, it has all
been charged to Paul?
A.

Yes.
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Q. You are sure you huvc got that deur?
Isn't it a fact that Spero didn't live at home, but
lived and hoarded and roomed at Cyprus Hall?

251

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

From April 1, 1935, to March 10, 1936?

A.

I don't remember exactly how long.

Q.

Was it about that long?

A. He lived there-he lived there three or
four months and five months. I don't think he
lived there six months, that I remember. I don't
remember more. I remember he live at Cyprus
HalL hut how long I don't remember.

Q. When you first testified in this case,
didn't you tell us he lived at home and paid rent
all the time?
A. Since he live with Cyprus he pay-live
in the home, because he just stay there. No, he
work-he was at work, and at time he want to
come home-stay home there three or four hours,
sometimes sleep home.

Q. When you testified 1n answer to Mr.
Metos' question before I questioned you, did you
say anything at all about his living at Cyprus
Hall?
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A.

Say anything, you say?

Q. When Mr. Metos questioned you did you
tell him that your son lived at Cyprus Hall for
several months?
A.
252

I don't remember of saying that.

Q. Did you testify before, in the trial, that
Paul paid the rent from January 1st on?
A.

Yes, I say he paid it sometimes.

Q.

Can you read?

A.

Yes sir.

Q. Now, your testimony begins right here.
Your testimony begins right there, and goes over to
the next page, and several pages. Will you find
any place in there where you testified that your
son lived in Cyprus Hall? Can you find any place
there where you testified that Paul paid any of
the rent?
MR. METOS:

Now, just a minute, I object

to that, Your Honor, as not proper cross-examination. He was not asked those questions either on
direct or cross-examination before. If I remem-
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her the rceord eorreetly. there wasn't a question
asked this witness about these matters.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
BY MR. STEWART:

Q. I will ask you again. In the former trial
you said that Spero was the only boy that helped
you?
A.

Yes.

MR. METOS:

What page is that?

MR. STEWART:

Page 92.

Q. The only hoy to help you. That is what
you testified to before?
A.

254

Yes sir.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION:
The rent in 1934 charged Spero's check. Spero
still worked ten days a month and I work fifteen
days a month. The rules of the Utah Copper-hecause I live in Utah Copper house-charge the
rent by the day, and so Spero work for ten days
and I work for fifteen days. I have run three to
five days rent and they transfer from Spero to
my check in 1935. In December I get sick, and stay
two months, and I not go to work. The rent went
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to Paurs check. Since today charge every month
to Paul's check, and Paul charge to me.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION:
The rent was changed from Spero to me in

255

1934.
256

Q. All right, now; that was on the tst day
of December, wasn't it?
A.

155

I don't remember the date.

MARY SALTAS, a witness for the plaintiff,
testified as follows:
My name is Mary Saltas and I live at Copperfield, Bingham. I am related to George Saltas.
MR. STEWART: Now, just a moment. If
the court please, at this time we assign the calling of this witness in this particular action, assign
it as misconduct, and object to the witness testifying, it appearing that this is an action for the
benefit of the father only, and the effect of producing in the courtroom and putting upon the
witness stand the present witness, is prejudicial
to the rights of the defendant, and we ask the
court to instruct the jury to disregard anything
that this witness may say, and eliminate from
their minds the fact that she has been called as
a witness in this action. I don't care to argue it.
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THE COURT:
may proceed.
158

The motion is denied. You

MR. STEW ART: 1 neglected to ask Mr.
Franz one or two questions. I understand counsel is willing to stipulate he would testify, if he
were recalled, that is, in substance, that Spero
Saltas, while riding in the automobile with Mr.
Franz, made no complaint about the manner of
the driving of the automobile by Mr. Franz, and in
approaching and entering the intersection made no
complaint or comment of any nature.
MR. METOS: We will admit that Mr. Franz
would so testify if he were called.
MR. METOS:

159

We rest, Your Honor.

T. W. SOUTHWORTH, a witness for the defendant, testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION:
My name is T. W. Southworth and I am a
traffic officer of Salt Lake City, being in that
service about two and one-half years as a traffic
investigator. During that time I have conducted
and participated in the conducting of tests relating
to speed of automobiles and distances within which
they may be stopped at different speeds and have
records of the results of those tests and have
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161

162

163

164

ous makes of cars with various types of brakes
may be stopped at different speeds. I have served
as a witness in testifying as to such speeds and
stopping distances. Last evening I went to the
intersection of K Street and Third A venue, and
made a test of a car driven north on K Street
immediately south of Third Avenue. I also made
a measurement of the distance between the south
curb of Third A venue and the north wall of the
Gem Grocery. It was 18 feet from the south curb
line of Third A venue to the north side of the Gem
Grocery. I drove an automobile north on K Street
to the right of the center line of the road to a
point where I was able to see the intersection of
Third Avenue and L Street. The right side of my
car was 11 feet west of the curb and I measured
the distance from the left front hub cap of my
automobile to the south curb line of Third Avenue and that distance was 17 feet. I have placed
upon the blackboard the position of my car,
with the left front hub cap 17 feet south of the
south curb line of Third Avenue and the right
side of my car 11 feet west of the east curb
of K Street.

Q. Mr. Southworth, as a result of your
testing of automobiles, various types of automobiles using four wheel brakes, what have you
discovered, if anything, as to whether or not
different makes of cars, assuming that the brakes
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are in good condition, stop or do not stop in substantially the same distance?
A.

Yes, they stop in the same distance.

Q.

Regardless of make?

A.

Regardless of make.

Q.

And that has been a fact that you have
established from tests that you have made?

A.
165

That is true.

Q. And you were driving a Chrysler fourwheel brake car?
A.

Yes.

Q. And from your experience and tests that
yon have made, is there any difference between
the distance that such a car will stop and the distance that other cars with four-wheel brakes will
stop under the same circumstances and road conditions?
A.

There is no difference.

Q. Now, I will ask you again at what rate
of speed you were driving your Chrysler car
when you were on K Street?
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MR. METOS:

1 make the same objection,

as incompetent.
·l'HE COURT:

The objection 1s overruled.

A.

At 18 miles per hour.

Q.

Where, if any place, on K Street did you

apply the brakes on your car?
A. At about 33 feet south of the south curb
line of Third A venue when the brakes first took
hold on the road surface.
166

Q. Now, will you tell us within what distance, after the brakes took effect, that your car
came to a complete stop?
A.

16 feet.

Q. And can you tell us whether or not your
car was still south of the south curb line of Third
A venue when your car came to a stop?
A.

It was.

Q. Now. when you made the observation to
the east on Third Avenue from the point 17 feet
south of the curb line-that is, where the left
front wheel hub cap was 17 feet south, from your
position in the driver's seat, were you then able to
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see automobiles proceeding east and west on Third
Avenue crossing L Street?
A.
167

168

I was.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
I had heard some remarks after the accident
that an accident had happened. I knew that an
investigation had been made. I did not know
that until after I went down last night.
ANDREW T. JACOBSEN, a witness for the
defendant, testified as follows:

169

170

171

DIRECT EXAMINATION
My name is Andrew T. Jacobsen and I am
thirty-one years old. I, with my father, operate
the Gem Grocery on Third Avenue and K Street.
I was in the store on the 27th day of January,
1938, when an accident occurred. I didn't see the
accident but heard the crash and immediately
went out the front door. The coupe, at least the
front wheels, were up over the curb and almost
to a large tree which stands in the parking on the
northwest corner approximately where the C is
on the blackboard. I saw the driver of the coupe.
Evidently he had been thrown out of the car. He
got into the car and backed it off the parking back
into the middle of the road on K Street more or
less where the impact perhaps took place. About
in the center of the street, in the center of K
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Street. After he stopped the car he got out again
and was on the curb. I heard him make a statement to one of the officers. I couldn't say which
one. The statement was to the effect that the
car was in the position then as when it was hit;
that that is where it stopped after the impact.

1?4

CROSS-EXAMINATION
In referring to the statement that I heard
I was talking about the man who drove the car
that was in the accident. I don't know his name.
The impact occurred approximately where you
have it.
.»

180

RAY VAN NOYES, a witness on behalf of
the defendant testified as follows:

181

DIRECT EXAMINATION:
My name is Ray Van Noyes and I live at
?65 Third Avenue, Salt Lake City, and lived there
in January of 1938. My home is between Land M
Streets on the north side of Third Avenue. I am
an employee of Salt Lake City in the License Department and am a special police officer. I recall
an accident that occurred at Third Avenue and K
Street January 2?, 1938, involving a D. A. Affleck truck. I was on my lawn going down to
my car to go to work after lunch. My car was
parked on the north side of Third Avenue facing
west. I casually noticed the truck and am in
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185
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the habit of observing ears. I watched it for 150
feet, somewheres around there. l didn't see the
accident. I heard it and looked up. I have had
experience in driving cars and in observing
the speed of cars. l have made arrests for speeding and given tickets to trucks and automobiles.
In my opinion the speed of the truck was 20 or
25 or 30 miles an hour, around there.
CROSS-EXAMINATION:
I was going down to my car and was talking to my wife. It was just a matter of observing
cars, the license plates on the back, to see if they
have city license plates or not. I observed it as I
would any other car, any truck goes by I look
to see all of them. I check on all the merchants'
and everybody elses trucks as they go by. In my
judgment it was going between 25 and 30 miles,
around there. It would be anywhere between 20
and 30. I figured it was a rate of speed that was
within the law. After the car passed me before
the crash occurred it was about a period of time
running about one of those small blocks, about
400 feet I should judge, one of those small blocks.,
At the other trial I was asked to come, I think
it was by Gerald Irvine. I think he was the attorney at that time. When I took the girls to the
hospital I reported the accident to the police
station. I don't know how Mr. Irvine knew that
I saw the accident. I talked to the police and he
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was working for the city. I reported to the police.
That is all.
NORMA CHAMBERLAIN, a witness on behalf of the defendant, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:

My name is Norma Chamberlain and J am
25 years old and live in Salt Lake City. My home
is in Cedar Valley but I have lived in Salt Lake
five years and am working on Second Avenue.
188
Vera Cook is in Cedar Valley. I was in the Affleck truck the day of the accident. I was sitting next to Kenneth Butte and had been acquainted with him before that day. We went down
189
Third A venue and Butte delivered at an address
on Third A venue. We stopped at all stop signs.
There is one on N Street and one on Virginia
Street. As we were going down Third Avenue we
were traveling about 25 miles an hour, at the regu·
lar speed. As we approached K Street I saw a
car in front of the grocery store. I saw it then
190 it shot up in front of us. It was near the intersection. I saw it on K Street (referring to Exhibit D) down here at a point at the south end
of the line running down the center of K Street
in the middle of the street from the south curb
line to Third A venue. At that time our car was
at a point at the east end of the dotted line running east in about the middle of Third Avenue.
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195

195Y2

I have driven an automobile for about eight years.
I have lost my driver's license but haven't had
it taken away from me. I had a license. I have
observed automobiles and speeds of automobiles.
I saw the coupe as it came up K Street into Third
Avenue. It was going fast, I should judge about
40 miles an hour. It shot up in front of us. Kenneth put down on his brakes and tried to turn off
and avoid the accident. He turned north and I
didn't know anything after that.
CROSS-EXAMINATION:
I was acquainted with Mr. Butte and have
been to entertainments with him. He passed by in
his truck and I got in. Miss Cook and I were
sitting on a ginger ale box. We were carrying on
a general conversation. I did not observe the
speedometer but am giving my best judgment as
to the speed. The coupe just loomed right up in
front.

Q. Now, Miss Chamberlain, do you recall
testifying on April4, 1938, right in this same courtroom, the same place where you are sitting now,
in the case of the State of Utah versus Kenneth
Butte? Do you recall testifying as a witness in his
behalf?
MR. STEWART: I object to the question
and assign it as an improper question, and prejudicial misconduct.
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MR. METOS: J just want to get the time
and place, Your Honor.
MR. STEW ART: T ask the court to instruct
the jury to disregard the question in the form that
it was put.
MR. METOS: This is cross-examination
now, and you have to put it in any form.
MR. STEW ART: T haven't any objection to
your fixing the time and place, and the date.
THE COURT:

196

The objection is overruled.

Q. Do you remember being cross-examined
by Marion Romney, the District Attorney?
A. Yes. I want to say that the car loomed
In front of me, I saw it before it came in front
of us. I saw it then it was in front of me.

Q. Did you see it right in front of you?
That is what I mean? You saw it when it was in
front of you, for the first time?
A.

I don't remember.

Q. Now, let me call your attention to this.
Right after the accident you made out an affidavit to-you gave a statement to a man by
the name of Parkinson, who is an adjuster for an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

97
Dffs. Tr.
Page

insurance company?
MR. STEWART:
197

Just a moment.

MR. METOS. I want to know.
MR. STEWART: Just a moment, if Your
Honor please: I assign that as prejudicial mis~
conduct. Mr. Parkinson is associated with me. I
take an exception to counsel's statement and at
this time I ask that the jury be discharged; prejudicial misconduct of the worst kind, and conn~
sel there knows it is, or should know it.
THE COURT:

The objection is overruled.

Q.

You made a statement to him, did you

A.

Yes.

not?

Q. And you stated to him, when he took
your statement, that when you saw the Ford car
it was going 35 miles an hour, didn't you?
A.
198

Yes, about that.

I don't remember making a statement in answer to Mr. Romney that I didn't make such a
statement to Mr. Parkinson. I don't remember
making it.
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MR. STEW ART: I have her statement here
if you want to see it, the original affidavit that
she signed, if you want to see it. If you want to
see it, I will be glad to let you have it.
MR. l\fETOS:

That isn't the one.

MR. STEW ART: That is the affidavit that
she made to Mr. Parkinson,-the statement she
made to him on January 28, 1938.
199

200

201

202

I don't remember telling the police officers
the car was right in front of us when I first
saw it. I thought I told them I saw the car and
then it loomed up in front of me. I don't rememher telling the officers that I was uncertain which
car was in the intersection first. I remember saying I did not notice the speedometer during the
trip. I remember saying that we were near K
Street still driving at the same speed when a car
loomed up in front of us. I don't remember exactly what I said.
MR. STEWART: I want the record to show
that the court is permitting the witness to refresh
her recollection, not from any statement made by
her, but from a report, or a copy of a report, of
E. H. Christensen and G. M. Hopkins, and not a
statement signed by this witness, and she is
reading a hearsay report signed by the officers.
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It would not he proper to so use such a hearsay
report to refresh the recollection of this witness.
MR. METOS: I don't want to refresh her
recollection, Your Honor. I just want to show her
this thing, and see whether or not she did make
this statement.
THE COURT: You may proceed.
Q. (By ~fr. Metos) Will you answer that
question?

A. I don't remember of saying when I first
saw the car that it loomed up in front of me,
but I know I saw the car before. I don't remember saying that I saw the car for the first time
when it loomed up in front of me.
203

204

205

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
The paper marked Exhibit 4 has my signature
on the last page. It is dated January 28, 1938. I
was taken directly to the hospital and that is
where the officers talked with me. I don't remember signing anything for the officers. They saw me
the day of the accident. When Mr. Parkinson
talked with me on January 28th he showed me
the statement made by Vera Cook. The writing
on the last page is written by me. Her stateme~t
was correct except in one respect. She didn't see
the car hut I did. In my statement on January
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28th to Mr. Parkinson I signed that her statment
was correct except that I did see the car going
north.
MR. METOS: Just a minute, please. I object, Your Honor, on the ground that it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, and hearsay,
what she said to Mr. Parkinson.
MR. STEW ART: You went into the statement she made to Mr. Parkinson.
THE COURT:

The objection

MR. STEWART:

IS

sustained.

Exception.

Q. Did you or did you not see the northhound car before it was right in front of you and
as it was entering from the south?
A.

Yes sir.

MR. BERNSTEIN: I object to that. Just
a minute-let my objection show before she answered the question. I object to it as incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial and repetitious, and
not proper redirect examination.
THE COURT:
206

The objection is sustained.

L. H. PETERSON, a witness called on behalf
of the defendant, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

101
Dffs. Tr.
Page

20?

208

209

DIRt~CT EXAMINATION
My name is L. H. Peterson and
live at
162 I Street. I operate a service station on the
corner of Third A venue and E and was so operating a station on January 27, 1938. I recall the
accident at Third A venue and L Street involving
a D. A. Affleck truck. I was half of a small block
from where the accident occurred. I was between
J and K Street going east. I was driving along
probably 20 or 25 miles an hour and slowed up because I had seen those cars traveling pretty fast
going up this hill. I have seen so many accidents
there. I was going up the street and saw the Franz
coupe and the next thing I seen I seen the car, the
truck, swirl around there in the middle of the
street. I saw the coupe before it reached in front
of the Gem Grocery. There is quite a clear vision
and I saw the car before it entered the intersection about, oh, 10 feet I should imagine. I have
driven a car about twenty years and observed
speeds and ridden in them. I would say the coupe
was going pretty fast. Yes I do. I should judge
35 to 40 miles an hour. It did not appear to slow
down as it entered the intersection. I saw the Affleck truck coming but I couldn't say as to the
speed. I couldn't judge its speed anywhere near
as accurate as a car going in front of me. I saw
the truck and it looked like they weren't going
to make it. The car was traveling just a little too
fast, I couldn't state how fast the truck was
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traveling. It looked like it was going to e a Ie.
I was the first one right on the scene. I wouldn't
be honest with you to give an estimate as to the
speed of the truck. It wasn't going nearly as fast
as the other car, I know that, or there would have
been something worse happen.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
I am working for myself. I lease from the
Utah Oil & Refining Company. I talked to the officers at the scene of the accident. I don't know
who the officers were. I didn't want to be brought
up here on the witness stand, to be honest with
you. I remained at the scene of the accident until
they took the pictures. They had taken the girls
away and were taking pictures. I don't know
who was taking pictures. I might have talked with
the officers but don't remember what I said. I
came here because Dave Parkinson came down
there and was-heard I was up there and I was
requested to come today. I took care of Dave
Parkinson's car until he moved out of the neighborhood. Parkinson wanted to find out about the
accident. I didn't write anything down. He came
down and talked with me and I told him what
I knew. I made no written statement. They don't
travel pretty fast on Third A venue because there
are so many accidents. They still try to make this
hill in high. I have seen them go up E Street.
They try to make it in high. I am right on the
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corner. I see it. I have driven a Ford. I know that
a Ford will go 40 miles an hour in second gear.
You can go 50 miles an hour in second gear. I was
about half way on one of those avenue blocks
214

215

218

219

between

J

and K. The truck was coming west,

the coupe was going north. There was nothing to
stop me from seeing the truck but as I say you
cannot tell as near accurate from here to the
door as you can from here to across the room. I
saw the coupe coming along here before it entered
the edge of that store. You can see at least 10 or
15 feet before the coupe entered the intersection.
The car going up K street was traveling pretty
fast. I see them all the time. The majority of
people go fast up there. 65 or ?0 per cent of the
people try to make those avenues on high gear.
With the present day automobile they can do it.
They can go to the top of Eleventh A venue and
E Street 40 miles an hour right to Eleventh Avenue. They don't generally go fast going east and
west. I didn't tell Mr. Parkinson the coupe was going 45 miles an hour. I told him just the way I saw
the car was going. If I told him any speed I said
the same speed I am stating right now here in this
court, 35 to 40 miles an hour.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION:
I didn't want to testify in this case. I was
very busy today but as a matter of courtesy I
came down.
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MR. STEW ART: I understand it may be
stipulated that at the dose of the testimony photograph may be taken of the blackboard for the purpose of making such photograph a part of the
record in this case.
MR. METOS:
hibit.

And introduce it as an ex-

MR. STEWART: Yes, introduce it as an exhibit, and the photograph take the place of the
blackboard.
MR. BERNSTEIN: I think before it is done
some of those marks should be identified.
MR. STEWART: Anything that isn't sufficient, we have no objection to having them
identified, but, at this time, we will offer the
blackboard, as Exhibit D in evidence.
THE COURT:

Exhibit D may be received.

MR. STEWART: And then the photograph
may be substituted in the record.
MR.
221

METOS:

That is right.

KENNETH BUTTE, testified in his own behalf, as follows:
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DIRECT EXAMINATION:
My name is Kenneth Butte and I am 26
years old. I am now living in Nevada. On the
27th day of January. 1938, I was driving the Affleck truck. The photographs, Exhibit 2 and ),
fairly represent the condition of K Street the day
of the accident. Exhibit 3 fairly represents the
condition of K Street looking south.
Exhibits 2 and 3 were offered and received
in evidence without objection.

223

224

225

226

The overall length of a 1936 Ford coupe is
15 feet 6Y2 inches. The overall width is 5 feet
10 inches. On the day of the accident I was delivering in the northeast section of the city. I
made the last delivery to Howard D. Travis and
offered to take the girls down town. I proceeded
west on Third A venue to Alta Street or Virginia
Street and stopped for the sign and then went
west on Third Avenue to N Street. I stopped there
for a stop sign. I then proceeded west from N
Street at, oh, 25 or 30 miles an hour. I wasn't
watching my speedometer all the way but that
is my best judgment. I have been more or less
familiar with the speed of automobiles without
constantly watching my speedometer. At K Street
and Third Avenue I collided with another car.
As I was just about to enter the intersection I
saw a Ford coupe coming north on K Street. I
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saw he wasn't going to stop or try to stop, came
right up the middle of K Street at a very good
rate of speed and seeing that if I didn't turn to
the right and put on my brakes and try to parallel
this coupe that he would crash into my left side
so I put on my brakes and turned to the right
and he caught the left front bumper, the left fender of my car and the front of my car hit his
right side just about in front of the back bumper.
The bumper must have caught in his car, and the
227
speed of his car ,just whipped the rear end of
my truck right around. Pretty soon the truck just
couldn't take it any more and it rolJed over on
its side. When I first saw this car coming I was
about 15 or 20 feet east of the intersection. When
r first saw the coupe it was a little further
south from the south curb line of K Street than
I was east of the east curb line. I imagine it was
within, oh, about 35 or 40 feet of the south intersection of K Street. When it entered the intersection I imagine it was going at a pretty good
rate of speed, 35 or 40 miles an hour, right in the
middle of the road. He didn't put on any brakes
and he didn't seem to swerve out or anything,
he just came right up the middle of the street.
From the time I first saw him and the time of
the crash was just a flash. I saw I couldn't miss
him if I didn't turn and finally he was right into
my left side, and just loomed up in the street,
228
and we hit. I took my foot off the gas as I apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

107
Dft'a. Tr.
Page

229

proached the intersection. I put on my brakes and
turned to the north. At the time I applied my
brakes I don't know exactly the speed, about 25
miles an hour. It could have been a couple miles
off from that. I was going slower than he was.
I was not in a hurry and neither of the girls requested me to hurry. Neither of them said anything about ·being late in keeping an appoointment.

Q. From the time that you saw this northbound coupe-when you first saw it-did you do
everything that you, in that instant thought that
you could do in an effort to avoid an accident?

MR. METOS:
I object to that as calling
for a conclusion of the witness.
230

231

232

THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
The accident occurred approximately in the
center of K Street slightly north of the center
line of Third Avenue. When the collision occurred the coupe was facing north and my truck
was in kind of a northwesterly direction. I observed the tire marks on the road. The mark
which runs west on Exhibit D from point Y
was not a straight mark. It ran in a kind of a
northwesterly direction. It wasn't just a single
mark. That single line is wrong. There was more
than one mark. There was two. The other mark
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was right along here immediately below this
dotted line. The tire marks did not run straight
east and west. They went straight east and west
for a ways and then swerved north.
MR. STEW ART: In your opinion, and in
your judgment, which car entered the intersection
first, your truck or the coupe?
MR. METOS:
a conclusion.
THE COURT:

I object to that as calling for

The objection is sustained.

Q.

In your judgment, from what you saw,
which car entered the intersection first, your car
or the northbound coupe?
MR. METOS: We object to that on the
ground it is calling for the conclusion of this
witness. The same question as the other.
THE COURT:

The objection is sustained.

Q. Do you have an opinion as to what
would have been the result so far as the collision
is concerned, if you had not applied your brakes
and turned your wheels to the right?
MR. METOS: We object to that on the
ground it is calling for a conclusion of this witness.
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THE COURT:
MR. STEWART:
234

236
237

238

239

240
243

The objection is sustained.
That is all.

CROSS-EXAMINATION:
.My recollection is a little better than in January. 1938. When my deposition was taken I said
that I put on my brakes and swerved to the
right and saw this car the first time it was on
the intersection. I recall thinking the thing over,
the position the cars were in when they hit. I
said it was right to my left. I didn't say in my
deposition that the first time I saw it was when
it was in the intersection. I didn't testify to that,
not to my knowledge. I said I saw that car just
as a flash. I might have made a statement to
the officers that I did not see the car until you
got right almost right on it and then saw the
car loom right before me. I might have made
that statement, I was pretty well jammed up
right after the accident. I might have said that I
was unable to say how fast the other car was
going as it loomed right in front of me. Yes sir
I swerved to the north and he did not even apply
any brake or anything or decrease his speed, just
kept coming. On this particular day I wasn't
late. I had not had my lunch yet. I was late for
my lunch hut wasn't in a hurry. Going down
Third A venue I was in the right zone for traffic,
about 10 or 12 feet from the curb in that vicinity.
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264

265

266

268

I didn't swerve my car very far tot h e nor th , maybe two or three feet. Yes in my deposition on
page 9 I said that as I approached the intersection
I saw a car right to my left. I put on my brakes
and swerved to the right. It was on the intersection, practically in front of me.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION:
When I said in my deposition that the car
was to my ]eft I can show you what I meant.
When I was about here-when I said the car
was to my left, when I got to about the intersection I saw the car to my left down here,
meaning to my left as I was proceeding into the
intersection. When I said in my deposition just as
I got to the intersection I did not mean in the
exact instant my front wheels crossed the imaginary curb line. I meant just as I approached the
intersection. On page 10 and 11 of my deposition
when I was asked whether I saw it right in front
of me, I answered, I saw it to my left, and in
the next question in answer to the question how
far to my left, I answered, oh, not every far,
about 20 feet or 30 feet. When I answered the
question that I just saw the car as a flash I
meant that he flashed right in front of me. When
I answered about seeing the tire marks I meant
that I did not examine them right after the accident before going to the hospital. In the deposition on page 140 I stated that it was my best
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estimation the ear was going Y> or 40 miles an
hour. The right front fender on my truck was
not damaged.
Defendant rests.
MR. STE,VART: (Jury excused from court
room) If Your Honor please, I have submitted and
handed to the court a requested instruction in connection ·with the question of insurance, and I
have done so without waiving the request twice
made for a mistrial.

At this time I want the record to clearly
show that at approximately the close or at the
close of the case, plaintiff's counsel's examination
of the jury and before I examined them, that
counsel asked each and every one of the fourteen
prospective jurors, including all of the women,
whether they were officers, directors or agents of
the Northwest Casualty Company; and I assign
that as prejudicial.
MR. MET OS:

And stockholders.

MR. STEWART: And stockholders; and I
assign that as prejudicial misconduct, and request the discharge of the jury.

297

Subsequently, and during the trial, counsel
In asking a question of one of the witnesses,
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"(l""{' stated in substance, or asked in substance, 1·f sue h
witness did not make a certain statement to Mr.
Parkinson, the insurance company adjuster, at
which time I assigned the asking of any such
question as prejudicial misconduct, and again request the court to discharge the jury.
It is my firm belief that the misconduct in
the respects mentioned were prejudicial, and that
no instruction that the court could possibly give
would eradicate from the minds of the jurors the
suggestions or implications upon the questions asked both of the jurors and of the one witness referred to, and that those jurors, and each of them,
in going into the jury room will have those suggestions and implications in the back of their
minds.

In requesting an instruction such as I have
requested, or in making any instruction on that
subject, I do not do so with the belief that an instruction will cure the error, and we do not waive
the motions heretofore made for a mistrial and
discharge of the jury, by making such a request.
THE COURT:
sers remarks.
298

Let the record show coun·

The blackboard, Exhibit D, was received in
evidence without objection. It was also stipulated
that the width of Third A venue was 50 feet instead of 45 as testified to by police officers.
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The jury was instructed in part as follows:

No. 11
145

You are instructed that the law imposes
a duty on every person who operates an automobile to keep a proper lookout ahead and to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and vigilance
under the conditions
and circumstances surrounding him, which means that degree of care
which the circumstances and surroundings require
and which is commensurate with the danger that
may he encountered. In this case it was the duty
of the defendant, Kenneth Butte, to drive his
automobile on said highway, using reasonable
care and prudence so that he could avoid injuring anyone or colliding with any person on the
highway, and while operating said automobile
thereon, it was his duty to keep a careful and prudent lookout for pedestrians and other cars on
said highway and intersection and to give warning, if necessary, of his approach with said automobile and to avoid colliding with them, and
it was his duty to drive said car at such speed
which would permit him to exercise control of
the same so as to decrease speed, or to stop, if
necessary, in the exercise of due care, to avoid
colliding with any person, or other car, on the
highway.
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No. 12
You are instruded that it is provided by the
Ordinances of Salt Lake City that it is unlawful
for any person to drive a vehicle in a residential
district in excess of 25 miles per hour; and you are
instructed that if, in this case, you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that at the time
and place complained of the defendant, Kenneth
Butte, drove his truck at a speed in excess of 25
miles per hour and that such speed was the proximate cause of the accident and injuries resulting in the death of Spero George Saltas, and that
the said Spero George Saltas was free from contributory negligence as herein defined, then your
verdict must be for the plaintiff and against
the defendant.

No. 13
You are instructed that it is provided by the
ordinance:;; of Salt Lake City that it shall be unlawful for any person to drive a vehicle on any
street in Salt Lake City at a speed greater than
is reasonable and prudent, having due regard
for the traffic, surface, and width of the highway
and the hazard at intersections, and any other
conditions existing, and no person shall drive at
a speed which is greater than will permit the
driver to exercise proper control of the vehicle
and to decrease the speed, or to stop, as may be
necessary to avoid colliding with any person,
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vehicle. or other eonveyance upon, or entering,
the highway, in compliance with legal requirements, and with the duty of drivers and other
persons using the street to exercise due care; and,
if you find from a preponderance of the evidence
in this case that the driver of said truck drove
said truck in violation of said ordinance and that
said violation was the proximate cause of the
accident and injuries resulting in the death of
said Spero George Saltas, and that the said Spero
George Saltas was free from contributory negligence as herein defined, then your verdict must
he for the plaintiff and against the defendant.
148

No. 14
You are instructed that it is provided by the
laws of this State that the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of
way to a vehicle which has first entered the intersection. When two vehicles enter the intersection
at the same time, the driver of the vehicle
on the left shall yield to the driver on the right.
You are therefore instructed that if in this case
you are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time and place complained
of the Franz car in which the deceased was riding entered the intersection of Third A venue and
"K" Street before the defendant's truck entered
the same, then the Franz car had the right of
way over the defendant's truck and it was the
truck driver's duty to yield the right of way to
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the Franz car, and if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure of the defendant to yield said right of way to the Franz
car, if you shall believe that the Franz car had
the right of way, was the proximate cause of
the injury to the deceased, then your verdict
must be for the plaintiff and against the defendant.
No. 15

149

You are instructed that the deceased, Spero
George Saltas, at the time of the collision, was
an invitee, or guest, of Gerald Franz, the driver
of the automobile in which he was riding, and if
you find from a preponderance of the evidence
that the deceased was injured by reason of the
negligent acts of the defendant, and as a proximate cause thereof, as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, and that said Spero George Saltas was
free from contributory negligence as herein defined, then the fact that the driver of the car in
which the deceased was riding, if you find such
to be the fact, was also guilty of negligence in
the operation of his car and his negligence contributed to the accident and injuries resulting in
the death of said deceased, such negligence on
the part of Gerald Franz would be no defense in
this action, and your verdict must be in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant.
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No. 1?
151

You are instructed that if by a preponderance
of the evidence you shall find that at the time
the Franz car had entered the intersection of
Third Avenue and ·'K .. Street. the defendant's
truck was at a point east of said intersection,
then you are instructed that the driver of the car
in which the deceased was riding was entitled to
assume that the driver of the truck would proceed in a lawful manner and yield the right of
way to him, and if by a preponderance of the evidence you shall further find that the driver of
the truck so failed to proceed in a lawful manner
and yield the right of way to the Franz car and
that such failure was the proximate cause of the
accident and injuries therein complained of, your
verdict must be for the plaintiff and against the
defendant.
The court refused to give the following instructions requested by the defendant, Kenneth
Butte, to which exception was duly taken. (Dft.
Tr. 323):

No. '7
While the deceased, Spero Saltas, was a
guest in the automobile driven by Gerald Franz,
and the negligence, if any, of Gerald Franz is,
therefore, not imputable to him, that does not necessarily mean that the defendant is liable in this
action in the event you find that defendant was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
186

Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

118
l'ff's. Tr.
Page

negligent. Negligence alone is of no consequence
unless it proximately causes or contributes to
cause an accident. Defendant may be negligent
and such negligence may not be a proximate
cause. In order for negligence of a defendant to
be the proximate cause of an accident such accident must be the natural and probable result of the
negligence of the defendant and be of such character as an ordinarily prudent person would have
known or would or ought to have foreseen would
probably result in an accident. It is also that
cause from which the injury results, unbroken by
a sequence of events put in motion by a third person, which defendant could not reasonably have
foreseen and expected. Therefore, in this case,
even though you find from the evidence that
defendant was negligent, yet if the accident was
not the natural and probable result of such negligence and the negligence, if any, of the defendant was not of such a character as an ordinarily
prudent person would have known or would or
ought to have seen might probably result in an
accident, but the accident was caused by the independent act of Gerald Franz, which act could
not reasonably have been foreseen and expected
by the defendant, then such negligence, if any, of
the defendant would not be the proximate cause
of the accident and your verdict should be for the
defendant.
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No. 13
195

You are instructed that if Gerald Franz. the
driver of the automobile in which deceased was
riding, could in the exercise of reasonable care,
have avoided the acc1dent by yielding the right
of way or slowing down or keeping a pi'oper lookout or other means, that it was his duty to do so,
and if he did not, he was negligent, and if such
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the
accident, your verdict must be in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff, although you
should also find that the defendant was negligent.

No. 14
196

You are instructed that the defendant in this
action claims that the accident was unavoidable
so far as he is concerned, that is, that it was
not the result of any negligence on his part, but
resulted from a combination of circumstances
not the result of any act or failure of said defendant. The law does not permit a recovery for
an accident which is unavoidable so far as defendant is concerned, but leaves the loss to he
horne by him on whom it falls, and if in this case
you find that the accident and resulting death of
Spero Saltas was unavoidable insofar as the defendant in this action is concerned, then your
verdict must he in favor of defendant.
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No. 15
19?

You are further instructed that an accident
which could not have been reasonably foreseen
or reasonably anticipated as the probable result
of negligence is not actionable and creates no
liability. Therefore, even though you find in this
case that the defendant was negligent, yet if you
also find that defendant could not in the exercise
of reasonable and ordinary care have foreseen
or reasonably anticipated that an accident would
probably result from such negligence, but that
the accident in fact resulted from a condition
over which the defendant had no control and
which he could not reasonably have expected
would result in causing an accident, then your
verdict must be in favor of the defendant.

No. 18
201

You have been instructed on the duty of the
driver of an automobile to keep a careful lookout. In this case, Gerald Franz had the duty in
approaching Third Avenue to keep a lookout,
particularly for automobiles approaching from
his right. A person who attempts to cross an intersection looking directly ahead without looking
up intersecting streets for approaching vehicles
must be deemed guilty of negligence. While there
is no specific standard as to the extent of observation, nevertheless the observation of the driver

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

121
Pffs. Tr.
Pa.~re

of an automobile for approaching traffic should
be at the first opportunity and at a point where
observation will be reasonably effieicnt for selfprotection. If the circumstances are such that a
prudent person would have observed an automobile approaching the intersection and in view of
its speed and other circumstances, it would appear
to him that such automobile would continue across
the intersection, then the failure to keep a lookout and make repeated observations would constitute negligence. The duty is not met by merely
looking. He must not only look, but must observe the traffic and the general situation in the
vicinity. He must look in such an intelligent and
careful manner as to enable him to see what a
person in the exercise of ordinary care and caution for the safety of himself and others could
have seen under like circumstances. If you find
in this case that the said Gerald Franz either
failed to keep such a careful lookout for automobiles approaching from his right as in this
instruction set forth, or if you find that he looked
and failed to see what was visible to be seen had
he looked, then the said Gerald Franz was negligent. Also if the said Gerald Franz either saw
the truck driven by defendant, or should have
seen the same in time to avoid the accident and
failed to apply his brakes or otherwise control
his automobile in an effort to avoid said accident, the said Gerald Franz was negligent. If you
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find that the said Gerald Franz was negligent
as in this instruction or in the other instructions
set forth and that such negligence on his part
was the sole proximate cause of the accident,
then your verdict must be for the defendant.
No. 19

200

You are instructed that there is no evidence
In this case that the defendant, Kenneth Butte,
failed to keep a proper lookout in approaching the
intersection of Third Avenue and K Street and
that claim of negligence against the defendant
Is therefore withdrawn from your consideration.

Dffs. Tr.
Page

320

During the argument of Mr. Metos to the
jury the following occurred:
MR. STEWART: I want the record to show
that counsel is reading from the deposition that
was taken before the first trial.
MR. MET OS: All right. "When you approached the intersection did you see any car?"
That is the question.
MR. STEWART: Now, if Your Honor
please, I assign counsel's reading of the deposition
as unprofessional conduct on his part, and assign
it as error in this case, and ask the court to instruct the jury to disregard it.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

123
Oft's. Tr.
p~

MR. METOS: What is the deposition for
if we cannot read it?
THE COURT: You are only reading what
you asked the witness in this case?
MR. METOS:

Yes.

THE COURT:
MR. STEWART:
321

You may proceed.
Exception.

After the jury left the courtroom at the conclusion of the arguments and before the instructions and exhibits were delivered to the jury,
the following took place:
MR. STEWART: Before these instructions
are given I would like to have the court approve
my showing in the record that Mr. Metos, in his
closing argument to the jury, in discussing the
question as to whether or not the defendant was
at a disadvantage, stated the fact that on the day
of the accident an investigator was out at the
scene of the accident in this case; and, further,
in his closing argument to the jury stated in substance, that the defendant secured an attorney
who spends all his time in the defense of this
class of cases. May I have the record show that?
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THE COURT:

Yes, the record may so show.

MR. MET OS: Let the record show we deny
we made those statements in that language and
in that form. I want to show the investigator was
out there that day or soon thereafter.
MR. STEWART: The statement that I made
was substantially correct.
322

THE COURT: Well, I think with the qualification as to the inspector going soon thereafter,
IS a proper qualification.
MR. STEWART:
is correct?

323

324

Otherwise my statement

MR. MET OS: Yes.
MR. STEWART: Comes now the defendant
and takes the following exceptions to the court's
instructions to the jury:
The defendant excepts to Instruction No. 11,
and to the whole thereof.
Further excepts to Instruction No. 11, and
particularly to the following words: "For pedestrians." Also to that part of said Instruction: "And
to give warning." Also to that part of Instruction
No. 11, as follows: "And to avoid colliding with
them."
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Defendant excepts to Instruction No. 12, and
to the whole thereof.

Defendant excepts to Instruction No. 13, and
to the whole thereof.

Defendant excepts to Instruction No. 14, and
to the whole thereof, and particularly the failure
in said instruction to include the element of the
deceased's own failure to use reasonable and ordinary care, it appearing from said instruction
that if the defendant was negligent, as in said
instruction described, that plaintiff could recover
even though the deceased himself was negligent in
failing to use ordinary care for his own safety.
Defendant excepts to Instruction No. 15, and
to the whole thereof.

Defendant excepts to Instruction No. 16, and
to the whole thereof, and more particularly for
the failure to give defendant's requested instruction covering the same subject matter.
Defendant excepts to Instruction No. 17, and
to the whole thereof, and particularly excepts to
that part reading as follows: "The defendant's
325
truck was at a point east of said intersection."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

L!6
Dffs. Tr.
Page

effect tells the
jury that if the defendant's truck was one foot
or one inch east of the east curb line of K Street
when Gerald Franz entered the intersection, or
was one foot or one inch into the intersection~
that defendant was required to yield the right of
way.
The instruction, as given, m

Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 1.
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 2, as requested.
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 4, as requested.
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 5, as requested.
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 6.
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 7.
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 8, as re·
quested.
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Defendant except to the refusal of the eourt
to give his requested Instruction No. 1 t. as requested.
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 13.
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 14.

326

Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 15.
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 16, as requested.
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 18.
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 19.
The defendant also excepts to the refusal of
the court to submit to the jury special interrogatories, which, if given and answered, would have
enabled the court to determine the correctness of
the verdict of the jury; that is, whether it was
based upon proper application of the law to the
facts found by the jury.
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140&
205

On the 12th day of May, 1939, a six to two
verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, Kenneth Butte, for
the sum of $3,061.00 and judgment was entered
thereon.

209

On the 15th day of May, 1939, the defendant,
Kenneth Butte, filed his motion herein to set
aside the second verdict and reinstate the previous
verdict, which motion is as follows:

(Title of Court and Cause)

MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AND
REINSTATE PREVIOUS VERDICT
TO THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED AND TO
HARRY METOS AND SAMUEL BERNSTEIN, HIS ATTORNEYS:
The defendant, Kenneth Butte, hereby moves
the court to set aside the verdict entered herein
on the 12th day of May, 1939, and reinstate the
verdict of the jury and the judgment entered
thereon, which verdict and judgment was for the
sum of $800.00, upon the following grounds:
1. That the court had no authority or right
to make the alternative order to increase the
judgment to $2400.00 or grant a new trial.
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2. That the verdict for $800.00 against the

defendant, Kenneth Butte, was not insufficient.
3. That the court could not set up its judgment, opinion or feeling concerning such verdict
as against the finding and decision of the jury.
4. That the alternative order was contrary
to and against the law.

GERALD IRVINE,
RALPH T. STEWART,
Attorneys for Defendant
Kenneth Butte.
211

On the 15th day of May, 1939, the defendant. Kenneth Butte, served and filed his motion
for a new trial as follows:
(Title of Court and Cause)
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MOVE FOR AND
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
TO THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED AND TO
H. G. METOS AND SAMUEL BERNSTEIN,
IDS ATTORNEYS:
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE
TAKE NOTICE that the defendant, Kenneth
Butte, one of the defendants in the above entitled
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cause, intends to move, and does hereby move, to
set aside the verdict of the jury rendered herein
on the 12th day of May, 1939, and to grant a new
trial in the above entitled cause upon the following grounds, to-wit:
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court

and orders of the court by which the defendant
was prevented from having a fair trial.
2. Abuse of discretion by the court which
prevented the defendant from having a fair trial.
3. Newly discovered evidence material for

the defendant which he could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial.
4. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict.

5. That the verdict
against the law.

IS

contrary to and is

6. Error in law occurring at the trial and
excepted to by the defendant.

212

This motion will be and is made and based
upon the minutes, records and files of the court
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in the above entitled cause and upon affidavits
to he hereafter submitted and filed herein.

GERALD IRVINE & RALPH T. STEW ART.
Afforne,l}s for Defendant
Kenneth Butte.
220

May 20, 1939. the motion of the defendant,
Kenneth Butte, for a new trial and to vacate
second verdict and reinstate original verdict was
duly argued and taken under advisement by the

court.
233

On the 2nd day of June, 1939, the court
denied the motions of the defendant. (See Dft.
Tr. p. 2)

224

Three of the jurors upon the second trial
made affidavit that during the deliberations of
the jury one of the jurors stated that he was in
favor of sticking the insurance company and that
all of the jurors had in mind that an insurance
company would have to pay the judgment.

129

That on the 19th day of April, 1939, an order
was duly made and entered herein allowing the
defendant, Kenneth Butte, to and including the
15th day of June, 1939, in which to prepare, serve,
settle and file his wayside hill of exceptions.
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237

On the 5th day of June, 1939, an order was
duly entered allowing the defendant, Kenneth
Butte, to and including the 1st day of September,
1939, in which to prepare, serve, settle and file
his wayside bill of exceptions.

239

Stipulation providing that the ,judgment roll
upon plaintiff's appeal should be transmitted to
the Supreme Court for use of both appellants on
their respective appeals.

438

Within the time allowed by law and the
orders of the court plaintiff's transcript of the
evidence, together with the proceedings, orders
and rulings of the court, was settled as a wayside
bill of exceptions for the defendant, Kenneth
Butte.

Dffs. Tr.
Page

2

On the 2nd day of June, 1939, the motion of
the defendant, Kenneth Butte, to set aside the
verdict and reinstate the first verdict was denied.

Plf's. Tr.
Page

235

On the 5th day of June, 1939, and within the
time allowed by law, the defendant, Kenneth
Butte, was allowed to and including the 1st day
of September, 1939, in which to prepare, serve,
settle and file his bill of exceptions herein.

Dffs. Tr.
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1

On the 25th day of August, 1939, and within
the time allowed by law and the orders of the
court, the defendant, Kenneth Butte, was allowed
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to and including the tst day of October, 1939. in
which to prepare, serve, settle and file his hill
of exceptions herein.

'-1'
D.}

3

It was stipulated that the original judgment
roll filed in the Supreme Court should be considered as a part of the record of the defendant,
Kenneth Butte, on his appeal and that subsequent
proceedings should also be certified to the Supreme Court and considered as a part of the
original judgment roll and that all such should
be considered and treated as the judgment roll
of the defendant, Kenneth Butte, on his appeal.

5

On the 29th day of September, 1939, the defendant, Kenneth Butte, served and filed his No~
tice of Appeal as follows:

(Title of Court and Cause)
NOTICE OF APPEAL
TO GEORGE SALTAS, PLAINTIFF HEREIN.
AND HARRY G. METOS, HIS ATTORNEY,
AND TO DAVID A. AFFLECK, doing business under the name and style of D. A. Affleck Grocery, ONE OF DEFENDANTS,
HEREIN, AND STEWART, STEWART AND
PARKINSON, HIS ATTORNEYS:
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YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE
TAKE NOTICE that the defendant, Kenneth
Butte, one of the defendants herein, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
from the verdict of the jury entered herein on the
12th day of May, 1939, the judgment entered
thereon and the refusal and denial of the undersigned defendant's motion for a new trial, and
from the whole thereof, including the granting
by the court of the plaintiff's motion for a new
trial from the first verdict and judgment entered
thereon, which motion was granted on the 2nd
day of March, 1939, and including also the refusal to reinstate the first verdict.
This appeal is taken on both questions of
law and fact, including proceedings relating to
the granting of plaintiff's motion for a new trial,
the refusal by the court to set aside the second
verdict and reinstate the first verdict.

Dated this 29th day of September, 1939.
GERALD IRVINE,
RALPH T. STEWART,

Attorneys for Appellant,
Kenneth Butte.
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330

CERTIFICATE OF THE COURT
STATE OF UTAH

1

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

J

~ ss.

I, the undersigned, Clarence E. Baker, the
judge before whom the above entitled cause was
tried, do hereby certify that the foregoing hill
of exceptions, consisting of pages 1 to 31?, with
17A to 1? J, inclusive, contains all of the evidence,
both oral and documentary, offered and received
in said cause, including all exhibits, which said
exhibits and documentary evidence when not attached or contained in the transcript of evidence
are treated and considered as attached to and a
part of the hill of exceptions, and said proposed
hill of exceptions contains all objections made,
rulings by the court and exceptions taken and
all proceedings on the trial of said cause, and
the parties have stipulated that the same may he
settled and filed as the defendant's hill of exceptions herein.

331

NOW, THEREFORE, the same is hereby
settled, allowed and approved as and for the hill
of exceptions in the above entitled cause insofar
as the same do not otherwise appear in the judgment roll or on record.
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Dated this 29th day of September, 1939.
CLARENCE E. BAKER,
judge.
ATTEST
WILLIAM J. KORTH,
Clerk
By C. L. COUNTRYMAN,
Deputy Clerk

(Seal)

(Title of Court and Cause)
7

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
I, WILLIAM J. KORTH, Clerk of the above
entitled Court do hereby certify that the record
in the above entitled case, was on the 24th day
of August, A. D. 1939 transmitted to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah, on appeal.
That the hereto attached papers, including
the Notice of Cross Appeal, and Bill of Exceptions
was filed in this office after the said files had been
transmitted to the Supreme Court, and that the
same are this date transmitted to the Supreme
Court to be made a part of the said record on
Appeal.
I further certify that the within appellants
did on the 29th day of September, A. D. 1939,
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file an Undertaking on Appeal in due form, aud
that the same was filed on the 29th day of September, A. D. 1939.
WITNESS my hand and the Seal of said
court at Salt Lake City. Utah. this 6th day of
October, A. D. 1939.
WILLIAM J. KORTH,
Clerk Third District Court,

(Seal)

By ALVIN KEDDINGTON,
Deputy Clerk.
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
Case No. 61 ?'3
GEORGE SALTAS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
DAVID A. AFFLECK, doing business under the name and style
of D. A. AFFLECK GROCERY,
De{endant,
KENNETH BUTTE,
Defendant and Appellant

ASSIGNMENTS
OF ERROR

Comes now the defendant, Kenneth Butte,
and upon the record heretofore transmitted to and
filed in this court pursuant to the appeal herein,
assigns the following errors upon which he will
rely for a reversal of the verdict of the jury and
judgment entered thereon on the 12th day of May,
1939, which judgment became final on the 2nd
day of June, 1939, upon the trial court overruling and denying his motion for a new trial:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 1
The court erred in permitting plaintiff's coun·
sel to interrog·ate prospective jurors respecting in·
surance indemnification after it had been made
to appear that the insurance policy issued to the
defendant, Affleck, did not extend protection to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

139

defendant, Kenneth Butte. and in not holding· that.
such interrogation would be prejudicial to the defendant. Kenneth Butte. (Dft. Tr. 19-23: Ab. 33-44.)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 2
The court erred in permitting plaintiffs counsel to ask each and every one of the fourteen
prospective jurors whether or not they were stockholders, officers or employees of the Northwest
Casualty Company, particularly after it had been
made to appear from the court's examination of
such jurors that at least twelve of the fourteen
jurors could not possibly have any such connection with any insurance company, and in failing
and refusing to discharge the jury on motion of
counsel of Kenneth Butte. (Dft. Tr. 23-35; Ab.
35-44.)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 3
The court erred in failing and refusing to
grant the motion of the defendant, Kenneth Butte,
for a discharge of the jury on motion of the defendant, Kenneth Butte, for misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in interrogating the jury respecting
the question of insurance. (Dft. Tr. 296-297; Ab.
111-112.)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 4
The court erred in overruling the objection
of the defendant, Kenneth Butte, and in failing
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and refusing to discharge the jury for prejudicial
misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in his cross-examination of Norma Chamberlain, as follows:

"Q. Now, let me call your attention
to this. Right after the accident you made
out an affidavit to-you gave a statement
to a man by the name of Parkinson, who
is an adjuster for an insurance company?
"MR. STEWART:
"MR. METOS:

Just a moment.

I wunt to know.

""MR. STE,VART: Just a moment, if
Your Honor please; I assign that as prejudicial misconduct. Mr. Parkinson is associated with me. I take an exception to
counsel's statement and at this time I ask
that the jury be discharged; prejudicial
misconduct of the worst kind, and counsel
there knows it is, .or should know it.
"THE
overruled.

COURT:

The

objection is

"MR. STE'V ART: At this time I
want the record to clearly show that at approximately the close or at the close of the
case, plaintiff's counsel's examination of
the jury and before I examined them, that
counse] asked each and every one of the
fourteen prospective jurors, including all
of the women, whether they were officers,
directors or agents of the Northwest Casualty Company; and I assign that as prejudicial.
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··.MR. ~IETOS: .:\nd :-.ll)ekholdcrs.
"MR. STE\V ART: And stockholders;
and I assign that as prejudicial misconduct,
and request the discharge of the jury.
"'Subsequently, and during the trial,
counsel in asking a question of one of the
witnesses stated in substance or asked in
substance, if such witness did not make a
certain statement to Mr. Parkinson, the
insurance company adjuster, at which
time I assigned the asking of any such
question as prejudicial misconduct, and
again requested the court to discharge the
jury.
"It is my firm belief that the misconduct
in the respects mentioned was prejudicial,
and that no instruction that the court could
possibly give would erradicate from the
minds of the jurors the suggestions or implications upon the questions asked both
of the jurors and of the one witness referred to, and that those jurors, and each of
them, in going into the jury room will have
those suggestions and implications in the
back of their minds.
"THE COURT: Let the record show
counsel's remarks." (Dft. Tr. 196, 197, 296,
297; Ah. 96, 97, 111, 112.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 5
That plaintiff's counsel was guilty of wilful
and prejudicial misconduct in again and in his
closing argument to the jury suggesting that the
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insurance company which would have to pay the
verdict, by following up his examination of the
fourteen jurors, his cross-examination of the witness Norma Chamberlain, by a statement not supported by the record, to the effect that an insurance adjuster or investigator was out at the scene
of the accident the day it occurred and that defendant, Kenneth Butte, secured an attorney who
spends all of his time in the defense of such
cases, which record is as follows:
"MR. STEWART: Before these instructions are given I would like to have
the court approve my showing in the record
that Mr. Metos, in his closing argument to
the jury, in discussing the question as to
whether or not the defendant was at a
disadvantage, stated the fact that on the
day of the accident an investigator was out
at the scene of the accident in this case;
and, further, in his closing argument to the
jury stated in substance, that the defendant secured an attorney who spends all
his time in the defense of this class of
cases. May I have the record show that?
"THE COURT:
so show.

Yes, the record may

"MR. MET OS: Let the record show
we deny we made those statements in that
language and in that form. I want to show
the investigator was out there that day
or soon thereafter.
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·"MR. STE\V ART: T h e statement
that I made was substantially correct.
"'THE COURT: \Veil. 1 think with
the qualification as to the inspector going
soon thereafter. is a proper qualification.
·".\IR. S T E \V A R T:
statement is correct?
""MR. METOS:
322: Ab. 123-124.)

Otherwise my

Yes ... (Dft. Tr. 321-

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 6
The court erred in permitting plaintiff's counsel, over objection, to read to the jury from the
deposition of the defendant, Kenneth Butte,
which deposition had not been offered or received in evidence, upon the following record:
".MR. STEWART: I want the record
to show that counsel is reading from the
deposition that was taken before the trial .
..MR. METOS: All right. 'When you
approached the intersection did you see
any car?' That is the question.
"MR. STEWART: Now, if Your
Honor please, I assign counsel's reading
of the deposition as unprofessional conduct
on his part, and assign it as error in this
case, and ask the court to instruct the
jury to disregard it .
..MR. METOS: What is the deposition
for if we cannot read it?
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"THE COURT: You are only reading what you asked the witness in this
case?
"MR. MET OS:

Yes.

"THE COURT:
"MR. STEWART:
Tr. 320; Ab. 122-123.)

You may proceed.
Exception." (Dft.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. '!
The court erred in giving to the jury instruction No. 11, to which instruction defendant duly
excepted. (PH. Tr. 145: Deft. Tr. 124: Ab. 113, 124.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 8
The court erred in giving its instruction No.
12, and particularly in instructing the jury that
it was unlawful for any person to drive a vehicle
in a residential district in excess of twenty-five
miles an hour and that if defendant drove his
truck at a speed in excess of twenty-five miles an
hour and that such speed was the proximate
cause of the accident, and that deceased was free
from contributory negligence, that a verdict
should be returned for the plaintiff, and to which
instruction defendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 146;
Dft. Tr. 324: Ab. 114, 125.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 9
The court erred in giving its instruction No.
13, to which instruction defendant duly excepted.
(Pff. Tr. 14?: Dft. Tr. 324: Ab. 114, 125.)
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 10
The court erred in giving its instruction No.
14, to which instruction defendant duly excepted.
(Pff. Tr. 148: Deft. Tr. 124: .-\b. tl =>. 12=>.)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 11
The court erred in giving its instruction No.
15, to which instruction defendant duly excepted.
(Pff. Tr. 149: Dft. Tr. 324: Ab. 116. 125.)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 12
The court erred in giving its instruction No.
17, to which instruction defendant duly excepted.
(Pff. Tr. 151: Dft. Tr. 324: Ab. 11 ?, 125.)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 13
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No. ?, to which defendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 186; Dft. Tr. 325;
Ab. 117, 126.)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 14
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 13, to which defendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 195; Dft. Tr. 325;
Ab. 119, 127.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 15
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 14, to which deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 196; Dft. Tr. 325;
Ab. 119, 127.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 16
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 15, to which defendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 197; Dft. Tr. 326;
Ab. 120, 127.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 17
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 18, to which defendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 201; Dft. Tr. 326;
Ab. 120, 127.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 18
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 19, to which defendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 200; Dft. Tr. 326;
Ab. 122, 127.)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 19
The court erred in holding as a matter of law
that the $800.00 verdict against the defendant
Kenneth Butte, was inadequate and in granting
plaintiff's motion for a new trial upon the grounds
of "inadequate damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice"
and in holding that a verdict may be set aside on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14?
the grounds of inadequeney. (Pff. Tr. 92. 4;0. I 19:
~\h.

27'. 28.)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 20
The court erred in setting up his own personal
belief or thought as against the unanimous decision of the jury upon the first trial and as against
at least three of the jurors upon the second trial
in holding that as a ma.tter of law the verdict of
$800.00 was inadequate, particularly in this case
where liability was so questionable that upon the
second trial two jurors were unwilling to agree
upon any verdict for the plaintiff, one juror upon
such second trial was in favor of an $800.00 verdict
and all eight jurors upon the first trial agreed
upon an $800.00 vedict. (Pff. Tr. 92, 430, 119, 224;
Ah. 2?, 28, 131.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 21
The court erred in holding that the verdict
in the first trial was inadequate and in granting
plaintiff's motion for a new trial when it appeared
from the evidence that plaintiff suffered no special damages; that deceased was thirty years of
age and plaintiff and two younger sons were
earning approximately $13.00 a day and that
damages to plaintiff resulting from deceased's
death were purely speculative. (Pff. Tr. 92, 430,
119; Ab. 2?, 28.)
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 22
The court erred in denying the motion of defendant, Kenneth Butte, to set aside the alternative order providing that a new trial would he
granted unless defendant, Kenneth Butte, consented to increase the verdict to $2400.00. (Pff. Tr.
124, 12?: Ab. 29, 30.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 23
The court erred in proceeding to retry the
case as against the defendant, Kenneth Butte, and
in refusing to sustain the objection of said defendant. (Dft. Tr. 11-18; Ab. 31, 33.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 24
The court erred in refusing to set aside the
verdict upon the second trial and reinstate the
$800.00 verdict returned in the first trial. (Pf£. Tr.
209, 233; Dft. T r. 2; Ab. 128, 131, 132.)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 25
The court erred in failing and refusing to
grant defendant's motion for a new trial. (Pff. Tr.
221, 220, 233; Ab. 129, 131.)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 26
The court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the examination of Officer Hopkins
as follows:
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"'Q. Now. officer. did you go down
on K Street and look over towards Third
Avenue?
''MR. STE'V ART: I make the further objection that there is no proper
foundation laid. No showing that the condition and visibilitY was the same. or there
were no obstructi~ns at the time the accident occurred which were not present
when the witness made the observation.

"Q. "\\Tell, officer, did you make the
observation that I asked you, about how
far you could see over on Third Avenue
froEn 1C Street?
'"MR. STEWART:
yes or no.

"A.

Just answer that

Yes.

"Q. All right now, assuming that
there were no obstructions at the scene
of the accident, about how far could you
see froEn 1C Street over on Third Avenue?
"MR. STEWART: We object to that
as containing an improper assumption. This
witness cannot assuEne there were no cars
there.
"TH~

COURT:

The

objection

is

overruled.
"MR. STEWART: I Enake the further objection it is incompetent, irrelevant
and immaterial, there is no proper foundation laid.
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"THE
overruled.

COURT:

The

obJection

is

"MR. STEWART: f make the further
objection that the question, if answered,
would have no probative value, there being
no position fixed, and no basis to make it
of any materiality.
"The COURT: The objection is overruled." (Dft. Tr. 4'3-44; Ab. 46-47.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 27
The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's objection to defendant's cross-examination of Officer Hopkins on the following record:

"Q. Did you ask Mr. Franz how his
car got from point X to point C and back to
point 2?
"MR. BERNSTEIN:
this as immaterial.

We object to

"THE COURT: The objection is sustained." (Dft. Tr. 55: Ab. 5L)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 28
The court erred in refusing to discharge the
jury and permit the answer of the witness, Gerald
Franz, to stand and to have the question and answer read by the reporter in the presence of the
JUry, upon the following record:

"Q. You haven't any claim against
the defendant in this case, of any kind?
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·'A.

No sir. that was taken eare of-

"MR. STE'V ART: Just a moment. I
take an exception to eounsel asking the
question of the witness and answering before I can make an objection. and assign it
as misconduct on the part of counsel and
ask the court to discharge the jury. The
witness started to answer and then answered the question before I had a chance to
object.
":MR. METOS:
I think.

He didn't answer it,

·'MR. STEWART:
enough of it.

He answered

"MR. MET OS: I don't want any error in this record. It may go out.
"MR. STEW ART: After you brought
it out, it is then too late.
"THE COURT:

Read the question.

"MR. STEWART: Just a moment. I
don't want the answer read right in the
presence of the jury.
"THE COURT: Mr. Reporter, will
you please read the answer and the question.
(Question and answer read to the
court)
"MR. STEWART: I take an exception to the question and answer being read.
"THE COURT: The motion is denied."
(Dft. Tr. 82-83; Ab. 56-58.)
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 29
The court erred in sustaining plaintiffs objection to the following examination of Gerald
Franz:

"Q. All right, you knew, as you approached Third A venue that it was your
duty to yield the right of way to a driver
approaching from the right if the car was
approaching as close to the intersection as
you were?
"MR. MET OS: I object to that on the
ground that it is calling for a legal conclusion.
"THE COURT: The objection is
sustained." (Dft. Tr. 104: Ab.65-66.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 30
The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's objection to the following cross-examination of the
plaintiff:

"Q. Now, between you and Paul and
Pete, at the time of Spero's death, you were
earning about $13.00 a day, were you not?
"MR. METOS: T object to that as
immaterial and irrelevant and incompetent and entirely prejudicial. I never asked
this witness if they made any money or
contributed anything to him.
"THE COURT: The objection is
sustained." (Dft. Tr. 148; Ab. 73-74.)
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 31
The court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the cross-examination of Norma
Chamberlain. as follows:

"'Q. Now, Miss Chamberlain, do you
recall testifying on April 4, t 938, right in
this same courtroom, the same place where
you are sitting now, in the case of the State
of Utah vs. Kenneth Butte?
"MR. STEWART: I object to the
question and assign it as an improper question. and prejudicial misconduct.
"MR. METOS: I just want to get
the time and place, Your Honor.
"MR. STEWART: I ask the court to
instruct the jury to disregard the question
in the form that it was put.
"THE COURT: The objection is
overruled." (Dft. Tr. 195Y2 ; Ab. 95-96.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 32
The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's objection to the following question asked the defendant, Kenneth Butte:

"Q. From the time that you saw this
northbound coupe-when you first saw it
-did you do everything that you, in that
instant, thought that you could do in an
effort
to Funding
avoid
an accident?
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"MR. METOS: I object to that as
calling for a conclusion of the witness.
"THE COURT: The objection is
sustained." (Dft. 229-30: Ab. 107-109.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 33
The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's objection to the following question asked of the defendant, Kenneth Butte:
"MR. STEW ART:
In your opinion,
and in your judgment, which car entered
the intersection first, your truck or the
coupe?
"MR. MET OS: I object to that as
calling for a conclusion.
"THE
sustained.

COURT:

The

objection is

"Q. In your judgment, from what
you saw, which car entered the intersection first, your car or the northbound
coupe?
"MR. METOS: 'Ve object to that on
the ground that it is calling for the con·
elusion of this witness. The same question
as the other.
"THE COURT: The objection is
sustained." (Dft. Tr. 233: Ab. 108.)
WHEREFORE, the defendant, Kenneth
Butte, prays that the alternative order made and
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entered on the 2nd day of March. 1939, grunting
the plaintiff a new trial herein be vueated and set
aside and that the $800.00 verdict and the judgment entered thereon on the 23rd day of May,
1938, he reinstated as the verdict and judgment
in this case. Appellant further prays that the verdict of the jury and judgment entered thereon in
the amount of $3061.00 on the 12th day of May,
1939, he vacated, set aside and reversed and that
this appellant have and recover his costs on this
appeal and costs incurred in the second trial
herein.

Respectfully submitted,
RALPH T. STEWART,
GERALD IRVINE,
Attorneys for Appellant,
Kenneth Butte

Received copy of foregoing Assignments of
Error this 2nd day of November, 1939.
HARRY G. METOS,
JOE P. BOSONE,
SAMUEL BERNSTEIN,
Attorneys for Respondent.
(Filed November 30, 1939)
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